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INTRODUCTION 
Original meaning originalism and living constitutionalism are com-
patible positions.  In fact, they are two sides of the same coin.  Although not 
all versions of these theories are compatible, the most intellectually sound 
versions of each theory are.  Recognizing why they are compatible helps us 
understand how legitimate constitutional change occurs in the American 
constitutional system.  The first Part of this Article offers a short summary 
of what I believe is the best account of original meaning originalism and 
what I regard as its central purpose: setting up a basic structure for govern-
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ment, making politics possible, and creating a framework for future consti-
tutional construction. 
The second Part of the Article tries to rethink what we mean by a “liv-
ing” Constitution.  I believe that living constitutionalism, properly under-
stood, implies something different from what most advocates and critics of 
living constitutionalism have assumed.  It is not primarily a theory about 
how judges should interpret the Constitution.  First, it is not a theory of 
constitutional interpretation—in the limited sense of ascertaining constitu-
tional meaning—but a theory of constitutional construction—that is, the 
process of building institutions of government and implementing and apply-
ing the constitutional text and its underlying principles.  Second, it is not 
primarily addressed to judges but to all citizens.  Third, it does not give de-
tailed normative advice about how to decide particular cases. Rather, it ex-
plains how constitutional change occurs through interactions between the 
political branches and the courts, and why and to what extent this process is 
democratically legitimate. 
I. FRAMEWORK ORIGINALISM AND SKYSCRAPER ORIGINALISM 
I begin by contrasting two ideal types of originalism, one I will call 
framework originalism and the other skyscraper originalism.1  As the names 
imply, these two types of originalism differ in the degree of constitutional 
construction and implementation that later generations may engage in.2 
Skyscraper originalism views the Constitution as more or less a finished 
product, albeit always subject to later Article V amendment.  It allows am-
ple room for democratic lawmaking to meet future demands of governance; 
however, this lawmaking is not constitutional construction.  It is ordinary 
law that is permissible within the boundaries of the Constitution.  Frame-
work originalism, by contrast, views the Constitution as an initial frame-
work for governance that sets politics in motion and must be filled out over 
time through constitutional construction.  The goal is to get politics started 
and keep it going (and stable) so that it can solve future problems of gov-
ernance.  Later generations have a lot to do to build up and implement the 
Constitution, but when they do so they must always remain faithful to the 
basic framework.  Put in terms of Article V, skyscraper originalism views 
amendment as the only method of building the Constitution, while frame-
work originalism sees a major role for constitutional construction and im-




1  Cf. T. K. SEUNG, INTUITION AND CONSTRUCTION: THE FOUNDATION OF NORMATIVE THEORY 
194–99 (1993) (distinguishing between “bedrock” and “skyscraper” accounts of political ideals).  Al-
though drawn for quite different purposes, Seung’s distinction, and his related concept of the “con-
strained indeterminacy” of human values, is quite relevant to how originalism works.  See T. K. SEUNG, 
PLATO REDISCOVERED: HUMAN VALUE AND SOCIAL ORDER 291–92 (1996) (noting concept of “con-
strained indeterminacy” of meaning). 
2  On the concept of constitutional “construction,” see the discussion infra Part II. 
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For the same reasons, skyscraper originalism and framework original-
ism offer different accounts of the democratic legitimacy of constitutional 
construction.  In skyscraper originalism, the political branches do not con-
struct the Constitution; they engage in ordinary politics within its bounda-
ries (unless they self-consciously pursue Article V amendment).  Similarly, 
judicial review is consistent with democracy when and only when it en-
forces the original bargain laid out in the Constitution and subsequent 
amendments, and otherwise leaves ordinary politics alone.  In framework 
originalism the story is quite different.  The political branches and the Judi-
ciary work together to build out the Constitution over time.  Their authority 
to engage in constitutional construction comes from their joint responsive-
ness to public opinion over long stretches of time while operating within the 
basic framework.  In doing so, they inevitably reflect and respond to chang-
ing social demands and changing social mores. 
Finally, framework originalism and skyscraper originalism offer con-
trasting accounts of how to constrain judicial behavior.  In skyscraper origi-
nalism judges are constrained when they apply the original constitutional 
bargain using the proper methodology for ascertaining it; when they fail to 
do this they are unconstrained and are simply imposing their own beliefs.  
Thus skyscraper originalism views following correct interpretive methodol-
ogy as the central constraint on judges.  Framework originalism also re-
quires that judges apply the Constitution’s original meaning.  But it 
assumes that this will not be sufficient to decide a wide range of controver-
sies and so judges will have to engage in considerable constitutional con-
struction as well as the elaboration and application of previous 
constructions.  Hence fidelity to original meaning cannot constrain judicial 
behavior all by itself.  The most important restraints on judges engaged in 
constitutional construction will not come from following proper interpretive 
theories but rather from institutional constraints.  These include the moder-
ating effects of multimember courts, in which the balance of power rests in 
moderate or swing judges, the screening of candidates through the federal 
judicial appointments process, social and cultural influences on the Judici-
ary which keep judges attuned to popular opinion, and professional legal 
culture and professional conceptions of the role of the Judiciary. 
Let me connect the distinction between framework and skyscraper 
originalism to the interpretive theory I have been developing over the past 
few years, which is both originalist and supports the notion of a living con-
stitution.3  I argue that original meaning originalism and living constitution-
alism are not only not at odds, but are actually flip sides of the same coin.  I 
call this theory of interpretation the method of text and principle.  The basic 




3  See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007) [hereinaf-
ter Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning]; Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Re-
demption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427 (2007) [hereinafter Balkin, Constitutional Redemption]. 
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stitutional text and to the principles that underlie the text.  But fidelity to 
original meaning does not require fidelity to original expected application.4  
Original expected application is merely evidence of how to apply text and 
principle.  Each generation is charged with the obligation to flesh out and 
implement text and principle in their own time.  They do this through build-
ing political institutions, passing legislation, and creating precedents, both 
judicial and nonjudicial.  Thus, the method of text and principle is a version 
of framework originalism and it views living constitutionalism as a process 
of permissible constitutional construction. 
The term “original meaning” can be confusing because we use “mean-
ing” to refer to at least five different things: (1) semantic content (e.g., 
“what is the meaning of this word in English?”); (2) practical applications 
(“what does this mean in practice”); (3) purposes or functions (“the mean-
ing of life”); (4) specific intentions (“I didn’t mean to hurt you”); or (5) as-
sociations (“what does America mean to me?”).5   
Thus, when we ask about the “meaning” of the Equal Protection 
Clause, we could be asking: (1) What concepts the words in the clause point 
to; (2) how to apply the clause; (3) the purpose or function of the clause; (4) 
the specific intentions behind the clause; or (5) what the clause is associated 
with in our minds or, more generally, in our culture.   
Fidelity to “original meaning” in constitutional interpretation refers 
only to the first of these types of meaning: the semantic content of the 
words in the clause.  We follow the original meaning of words in order to 
preserve the Constitution’s legal meaning over time, as required by the rule 
of law.  Otherwise, if the dictionary definitions of words changed over time, 
their legal effect would also change, not because of any conscious act of 
lawmaking (or even political mobilization), but merely because of changes 
in language.  So, for example, when Article IV says that the United States 
must protect the states from “domestic violence,”6 we should employ the 
original meaning, “riots” or “insurrections,” not the contemporary meaning, 
“spousal assaults.” 
Fidelity to original meaning does not, however, require fidelity to any 
of the other types of original meaning, although these forms of meaning 
may be relevant evidence of original semantic content.  More to the point, 
these other kinds of meaning may be very important for purposes of consti-
tutional construction. 
Fidelity to original meaning as original semantic content does not re-
quire that we must apply the Equal Protection Clause the same way that 




4  See Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 3, at 292; Balkin, Constitutional Redemp-
tion, supra note 3, at 433–34.  
5  See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism (Illinois Pub. Law Research Paper No. 07-24, 
2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244.  
6  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
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It does not require that we must articulate the purposes or functions of the 
clause in exactly the same way the Framers and ratifiers would have or ap-
ply it only consistent with their specific intentions.7  Finally, it does not 
mean that the clause can only have the same associations to us that it had to 
the adopting generation.  Today, for example, the clause is associated with 
many things in our minds and our political culture—like Dr. Martin Luther 
King and the civil rights revolution—that the adopting generation could not 
have known about.  These four other types of original meaning may be 
quite relevant to constitutional construction, and to how we should create 
and apply legal doctrines.  But they are not dispositive on these questions. 
To be faithful to original meaning in the sense I am concerned with, we 
need to know the concepts that the words in the Equal Protection Clause re-
ferred to when it was originally enacted.  This is not purely an investigation 
into semantic definitions.  We also want to know if words in the clause 
were understood nonliterally—for example, as a metaphor or a synecdo-
che8—and we want to know whether some words referred to generally rec-
ognized terms of art.9  If the text states a determinate rule, we must apply 
the rule in today’s circumstances.  If it states a standard, we must apply the 
standard.  And if it states a general principle, we must apply the principle. 
I argue that this approach follows from paying attention to the reasons 
why constitutional designers choose particular language.  Sometimes draft-
ers choose to express themselves in clear rules, creating hard-wired features 
that are relatively determinate.  Sometimes they use standards, and some-
times they articulate principles.  These standards and principles can be 
broad, abstract, or vague.  Then we have to implement them through prac-
tice, through state-building, or through precedents.  And sometimes the 
drafters of a constitution deliberately say nothing at all about a particular is-
sue.  Then we must fill in the details where they were silent. 
I argue that the choice of rules, standards, principles, or silence is not 
accidental.  Constitutional drafters use rules because they want to limit dis-
cretion; they use standards or principles because they want to channel poli-
tics but delegate the details to future generations.10  They leave things silent 
for any number of reasons: because certain matters go without saying, be-
cause they are implicit in the structure of the constitutional system, because 




7  That we are not bound by the specific purposes of the adopters is especially important in the case 
of structural arguments, and in the case of textual commitments to unenumerated rights, for example, in 
the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Some 
structural arguments depend on events that occurred after enactment, and unenumerated rights by their 
nature cannot be detailed in advance.  See Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 3, at 502.   
8  See Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 3, at 304; Balkin, Constitutional Redemp-
tion, supra note 3, at 491–93. 
9  See Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 3, at 304; Balkin, Constitutional Redemp-
tion, supra note 3, at 491–93 
10  See Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 3, at 457–61.  
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issue and therefore handed the problem off to the future, or because the 
adopters simply wanted to leave space for later generations to design and 
build institutions appropriate to the situations they would face.11 
A very familiar argument for constitutionalism is that it seeks to limit 
future discretion and prevent future generations from making bad decisions 
or straying from good values.  Although some constitutional features have 
this purpose and effect, I do not believe that this is the best general argu-
ment for constitutionalism.  Constitutions are designed to create political in-
stitutions and to set up the basic elements of future political 
decisionmaking.  Their basic job is not to prevent future decisionmaking 
but to enable it.  The job of a constitution, in short, is to make politics pos-
sible.  That is why constitutions normally protect rights and create struc-
tures. 
Both rights protections and structural protections are necessary to con-
struct a workable political sphere and to support a civil society in which 
politics—and everyday life—can occur.  Not every form of politics is 
equally acceptable; together rights and structure shape social and political 
relations, the kinds of things that people can do to each other, and the duties 
they owe to one another.  Similarly, without some structural or rights pro-
tections for institutions of civil society, a decent form of politics is not pos-
sible.  Moreover, the Constitution’s ability to maintain a peaceful and stable 
politics ultimately depends on civil society and its related institutions; 
hence the Constitution must do its part to help protect and foster them.  Fi-
nally, some people, perhaps most, may not want to be actively engaged in 
political life except perhaps for voting at regular intervals; ordinarily they 
may not be roused to political action unless they feel the country has gone 
seriously wrong or rights they regard as very important have been violated.  
A political constitution helps them to live peacefully with others in civil so-
ciety by requiring the state—and other people—to respect their rights and to 
act fairly and nonarbitrarily toward them. 
From a design perspective, the use of different types of legal norms 
and silences makes perfect sense.  Sometimes, designers use rules to set up 
the basic framework of institutions.  They do this not merely to assign roles 
and tasks or to conclusively limit or grant power.  Rather, as the American 
Constitution imagines, designers might use rules to place different parts of 
the government in competition with each other, producing an indeterminate 
result.  As I discuss later on, this is how the American system of living con-
stitutionalism works in practice. 
Constitution-makers from the American Constitution to the present day 
have also included rights guarantees that sound in the vague and abstract 
language of principles.  This choice of language makes little sense if the 
purpose of constitutionalism is to strongly constrain future decision-




11  Id. 
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ing a set of key values and commitments that set the terms of political dis-
course, and that future generations must attempt to keep faith with.  Ab-
stract rights provisions are valuable even if their contours are not fully 
determined in advance.  They shape the way that political actors understand 
and articulate the values inherent in the political system; they shape the be-
liefs of political actors about what they can and cannot do, what they are 
fighting for and what they are fighting against.12 
Finally, constitutional silences and open spaces reflect the fact that 
adopters are not omniscient and cannot prepare for every eventuality.  Fu-
ture generations must build up institutions and practices to make politics 
and governance possible and successful in changing circumstances; they 
must adapt as the country faces new problems and new opportunities cre-
ated by changes in foreign threats, technology, economic conditions, cul-
ture, and demographics. 
To see how these ideas about constitutional language work in practice, 
consider the different sections of the Fourteenth Amendment, sent to the 
states together in 1866 and ratified in 1868.13  Section 1 of the Amendment 
is the most familiar to us today: its first sentence offers a fairly clear and de-
terminate rule for citizenship, which was added at the last minute.14  But 
most of Section 1 is written in abstract and vague language combining stan-
dards, principles, and terms of art.  It speaks of “privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States,” “due process of law,” and “equal protection 
of the laws.”15  The reason for this is clear: The Framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment understood Section 1 as a statement of general principles and 
they wanted to leave open certain questions—including the tricky questions 
of racial segregation, miscegenation, and black suffrage—to a later time.16  
They wanted to offer a general statement of principles about the rights of 
citizens—not limited to questions of black equality—that would no doubt 
be filled out by courts and especially by Congress, acting under its en-
forcement powers under Section 5. 
With the glittering generalities of Section 1, contrast the more rule-
bound and hardwired features of Sections 2, 3, and 4.  Section 2 finesses the 
problem of black suffrage in a compromise: states that denied black men the 




12  See id. at 459–61. 
13  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
14  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
15  Id. 
16  See WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO 
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 143–45 (1988) (arguing that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment deliber-
ately used language containing broad principles, leaving specific applications to future generations to 
work out); Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 59–63 (1955) (moderates and radicals chose open-ended “language capable of growth” that 
papered over their differences and allowed them to present a unified front that would appeal to a wide 
range of constituencies). 
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counted for purposes of calculating representation in the House and in the 
Electoral College.17  Section 3 bars former rebels from holding federal and 
state offices unless Congress, “by a vote of two-thirds of each House, re-
move[s] such disability.”18  Section 4 guarantees recognition of the debt of 
the Union in conducting the war and prohibits the government from paying 
off any of the debt of the Confederacy; it also extinguishes any property 
claims of former slaveholders.19 
Why would the very same Congress that used abstract standards and 
principles in Section 1 use such different language in Sections 2, 3, and 4?  
The Fourteenth Amendment was an armistice that set out the new rules of 
politics following the Civil War.20  It was truly a “Reconstruction” amend-
ment in every sense of the word.  Therefore, it set up relatively clear rules 
about how to resolve key unsettled issues of the war in Sections 2, 3, and 4, 
while declaring (and thus leaving open for future specification) the scope of 
the rights protected in Section 1. 
The Fourteenth Amendment, which is part of our country’s second 
Founding, contains in a microcosm the various different uses of constitu-
tional language—and the purposes behind them—that exist in most consti-
tutions, including our own.  The choice of rules, standards, principles, and 
silences in this Amendment makes sense when we look at it from the per-
spective of the drafters, who constrained some things and left others open in 
the hopes that politics could flourish in the wake of a devastating Civil War. 
So too, the 1787 Constitution is a framework for government respond-
ing to the widely acknowledged failures of the Articles of Confederation 
and the need to confront a panoply of dangers and problems, some foreign 
and some domestic.  It was a blueprint for a “more perfect union”21 that left 
much to be worked out in time; and indeed, controversies about how to 
build out the country’s political and governing institutions began almost as 
soon as the ink was dry.  Within three decades, for example, the new coun-
try had to figure out, among other things, whether it had the power to ac-
quire new territory, whether it could spend for the relief of citizens in 




17  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.  The Fourteenth Amendment’s silence on the question of 
black suffrage left open space for Congressional action.  In 1867 and 1868, while the Fourteenth 
Amendment was still before the states, Congress passed a series of Reconstruction Acts: Act of March 2, 
1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428; Act of March 23, 1867, ch. 6, 15 Stat. 2; Act of July 19, 1867, ch. 30, 15 
Stat. 14; Act of March 11, 1868, ch. 25, 15 Stat. 41.  These required states in the former Confederacy to 
hold new constitutional conventions in which blacks could vote for delegates, leading to new state con-
stitutions that secured black suffrage in the South.  The Fifteenth Amendment finally granted black 
males the right to vote throughout the United States in 1870.  U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
18  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 3. 
19  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4. 
20  See Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 3, at 456. 
21  U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
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create financial institutions like a national bank.22  In some cases, such as 
the 1800 election,23 the blueprint proved inadequate and so new amend-
ments were necessary.  Even before this, a declaration of rights, phrased in 
suitably vague and abstract terms, was the price of ratification. 
A theory of originalism that takes this designer’s perspective sees the 
initial versions of a constitution as primarily a framework for governments, 
a skeleton on which much will later be built.  We look to original meaning 
to preserve this framework over time, but it does not preclude us from a 
wide range of possible future constitutional constructions that implement 
the original meaning and that add new institutional structures and political 
practices that are not inconsistent with it.  This approach is the essence of 
framework originalism.  In this model of originalism, the Constitution is 
never finished, and politics and judicial construction are always building up 
and building out new features. 
The contrasting position, which I call skyscraper originalism, assumes 
that the purpose of the Constitution is to constrain foolish and unwise deci-
sionmaking in the future.  The Constitution is a bulwark, largely finished, 
bequeathed to future generations to prevent them from falling prey to hu-
man folly, base motivations, temptation, and decline.24  The goal is not to 
create space for institutional growth but to prevent abandonment of basic 
norms.  Given this overarching goal, we should interpret the Constitution to 
resolve as many of the details as possible, dividing up clearly what is left to 
the political process and what is not.  The Constitution may in fact leave a 
great deal up to everyday politics; however, absent the use of the amend-
ment process, these political decisions do not add anything significant to the 
constitutional plan.  They occur as permissible activity within the plan. 
Skyscraper originalism produces a somewhat different take on what a 
commitment to “original meaning” requires.  For example, it becomes im-
portant to turn abstract and vague rights provisions into something as de-
terminate and rule-like as possible.  Only then will these provisions 
properly do their job of constraining unconstitutional action and demarcat-




22  See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS 1801–1829, at 
87–107, 250–58, 290–95 (2001). 
23  See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND 
THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY (2005) (explaining how the Constitution’s original model of 
presidential election produced a constitutional crisis). 
24  See Jon Elster, Intertemporal Choice and Political Thought, in CHOICE OVER TIME 35 (George 
Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992) (discussing constitutions as precommitment devices); Stephen 
Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 
195 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988) (discussing historical arguments for and against the use of 
precommitment devices in constitutions); ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law Sys-
tem: The Role of the United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 40–41 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) 
(“[A constitution’s] whole purpose is to prevent change—to embed certain rights in such a manner that 
future generations cannot readily take them away.”).   
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building—may proceed.  One way to do this is to identify the original 
meaning as closely as possible with the original expected application.  That 
way we do not have to leave the scope and application of rights provisions 
to later generations.  Interpreting rights provisions this way may not prevent 
very much, and it may greatly hamstring the powers of the federal govern-
ment; but at the very least it will prevent future generations from abandon-
ing the concrete value commitments and expectations of the adopting 
generation. 
Thus, for example, we might decide that the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause bans only those punishments that the generation of 1791 
thought were cruel and unusual.  This does not ban very much from our 
present day perspective, but it does protect us from a later, crueler time.25  If 
it does not aspire to moral improvement, at the very least it prevents moral 
rot and decay.26  Likewise the scope of federal power should be limited to 
the expectations of the 1787 Constitution.  That might prevent a great deal 
of democratic lawmaking at the federal level—indeed, it would render un-
constitutional most of the modern administrative and welfare state and 
much federal civil rights protection.  But at least it preserves state and local 
exercises of democracy and it preserves the sort of freedom that the Framers 
understood and expected. 
These two examples suggest why nobody really adheres to skyscraper 
originalism, at least in its most stringent form.  Most originalists today think 
that there has to be considerable room for development of constitutional 
powers and rights over time.  Sometimes they do it through the backdoor by 
arguing, as Justice Scalia does, that nonoriginalist precedents are a prag-
matic exception to commitment to original meaning.27  Thus, we accept the 
New Deal settlement and the vast array of federal regulatory powers to 
regulate health, safety, the economy, the environment, and civil rights—
which are far more extensive than the Framers would have dreamed of—
because it is simply too late to go back now and people have come to expect 




25  SCALIA, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 24, at 129, 145 (arguing that 
we should look to the original expected application of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause be-
cause we need protection against “the moral perceptions of a future, more brutal generation”). 
26  SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, supra note 24, at 40–41. 
27  Scalia, Response, supra note 24, at 140. 
28  See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring); Nomination of Judge Rob-
ert H. Bork: Hearings before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 112–13, 264–65, 
292–93, 465 (1987), reprinted in 14 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND 
REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE 
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 1916–1987, at 292–93, 444–45, 472–73, 645 (Roy M. Mersky & 
J. Myron Jacobstein eds., 1989) (testimony of Robert H. Bork, Sept. 15, 1987–Sept. 19, 1987); Antonin 
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 861–64 (1989); Philip Lacovara, A Talk 
with Judge Robert H. Bork, DISTRICT LAW., May/June 1985, at 29, 32; cf. John O. McGinnis & Michael 
B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 NW. L. REV. 803, 836–37 (2009) (offering a 
consequentialist analysis for determining when nonoriginalist precedents should be retained). 
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views the state-building of the past century as a mistake that we must retain 
out of a combination of reliance and inertia.  But if it is an exception, it is 
an exception that threatens to swallow the rule of fidelity to original mean-
ing, at least if we construe original meaning in this way.  
I think it is far better to see state-building during the twentieth century, 
including both the administrative and welfare state and the civil rights revo-
lution, not as pragmatic exceptions to originalism but as perfectly consistent 
with it.  These are exercises in constitutional construction that have imple-
mented and built out the skeletal system of 1787 and adapted it to contem-
porary problems of governance.  The growth of the modern state fits poorly 
with skyscraper originalism, which imagines a very different sort of build-
ing entirely.  It fits well, however, with framework originalism, because the 
latter assumes that the Constitution was never a completed thing in the first 
place.  It was a plan of government with an initial allocation of powers, 
rights, and responsibilities that would be built up through collective action 
and political contestation over time. 
It should by now be obvious why framework originalism is consistent 
with a wide variety of different forms of living constitutionalism, although 
certainly not with all of them.  Framework originalism permits a great deal 
of contingency in how the Constitution turns out; each of these versions can 
still be faithful to text and principle.  Put another way, framework original-
ism does not assume that the nature of the Constitution is fully contained in 
its origins in the way that the structure of an oak is contained in an acorn.  It 
does not assume a determinate path of evolutionary development.  Much is 
left to circumstance and chance, and this nation, like all nations, will face a 
wide range of unexpected upsets and challenges that will shape and alter its 
path and its character, sometimes irrevocably. 
II. RETHINKING LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM 
A. Living Constitutionalism as Constitutional Construction 
Just as we need to rethink originalism, we also need to rethink the idea 
of a living constitution.  People often speak of living constitutionalism as a 
theory of interpretation, but what we call constitutional “interpretation” ac-
tually involves more than one activity.  One type of activity, which we 
might call interpretation proper, is the ascertainment of meaning.  Another, 
which constitutes a far larger task, is constitutional construction—
implementing and applying the Constitution in practice, and building out 




29  On the idea of constitutional construction, see KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 5 (1999) [hereinafter 
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION].  See also KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(1999) [hereinafter WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION].  Whittington defines constitu-
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is less a theory of interpretation-as-ascertainment than a theory about inter-
pretation-as-construction.  Ascertaining meaning is a key element of inter-
pretation, but it is often not enough to make the Constitution workable.  
Clauses may still be vague or the Constitution may be silent.  We must still 
create doctrines and laws to concretize principles and decide cases, and we 
must build institutions to make the constitutional system work in practice.  
For this we must turn to constitutional construction. 
We need construction in two situations.  The first is when the terms of 
the Constitution are vague or silent on a question and to apply them we 
must develop doctrines or pass laws to make its words concrete or fill in 
gaps.30  The second is when we need to create laws or build institutions to 
fulfill constitutional purposes.31  Both of these practices are the work of liv-
ing constitutionalism. 
Framework originalism requires that we interpret the Constitution ac-
cording to its original meaning.  Living constitutionalism concerns the 
process of constitutional construction.  Framework originalism leaves space 
for future generations to build out and construct the Constitution-in-
practice.  Living constitutionalism occupies this space.  It explains and jus-
tifies the process of building on and building out.  That is how the two ideas 
are related, and why they do not conflict but in fact are inextricably con-
nected. 
Put this way, you might think that the original meaning and constitu-
tional construction do not overlap at all.  One simply builds on where the 
other leaves off.  But it is not so in practice.  Because constitutional con-
struction occurs in the same political space and time as the amendment 
process, the two processes can sometimes substitute for each other.  Vague 
                                                                                                                 
tional interpretation as the “process of discovering the meaning of the constitutional text,” while consti-
tutional construction is “essentially creative, though the foundations for the ultimate structure are taken 
as given.  The text is not discarded but brought into being.”  Id. at 5.   
In Whittington’s model, all branches may engage in constitutional interpretation, but constitutional 
construction is reserved only for the political branches.  Id. at 9, 11–12, 221 n.3.  In contrast, Randy Bar-
nett and I have argued that all branches may engage in constitutional construction.  See RANDY 
BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 118–27 (2004); 
Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 3, at 293–94, 300–307; Balkin, Constitutional Re-
demption, supra note 3, at 435, 470–71, 476–81. 
30  See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 5–12 (2001) (arguing that 
much of the Judiciary’s work involves creating doctrines and tests to give meaning to constitutional val-
ues); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 1274, 1276, 1317–18 (2006) (noting the existence of gaps between constitutional meaning and 
judicially enforceable rights that must be filled in through doctrinal implementation). 
31  See Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1742 (2007) (noting the 
importance of “landmark statutes that express [a constitutional] new regime’s basic principles”); Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1215–16 (2001) (offering an 
account of durable “superstatutes” that “seek[] to establish a new normative or institutional framework 
for state policy” and have “broad effect[s] on the law”); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the 
Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 411–13 (2007) (“[M]uch of the law that constitutes our government 
and establishes our rights derives from legal materials outside the Constitution itself.”).   
103:549  (2009) Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution 
 561
clauses can be built out through doctrine and institution-building in ways 
that might also be achieved through amendment.  (The same is also true 
with various silences and gaps in the original Constitution.)  This is not a 
bug in our constitutional system; it is a feature.  Nevertheless, the processes 
of amendment and construction are not identical, and what each can achieve 
in practice does not always overlap. 
Some kinds of changes—like the abolition of the Electoral College or 
altering the length of the President’s term of office—cannot easily be 
achieved through construction; they require amendment.  Constructions 
may be less durable than amendments: interbranch understandings can be 
altered through practice, statutes can be repealed and doctrinal constructions 
overturned, distinguished, or made irrelevant.  Conversely, amendment may 
be an awkward and cumbersome way to respond to certain problems, revise 
previous doctrinal constructions, create new rules, or promote wholesale 
changes in government.  Constructing doctrine gradually through caselaw 
development and creating framework statutes and new institutions may be a 
more nimble and effective method. 
Today people generally associate “living constitutionalism” with judi-
cial decisions; but the political branches actually produce most living con-
stitutionalism.  Most of what courts do in constitutional development 
responds to these political constitutional constructions.  Courts largely ra-
tionalize, legitimate, and supplement what the political branches do, creat-
ing new doctrines along the way.32 
The very concept of a “living” Constitution arose in the early twentieth 
century due to innovations by Congress and by state and local governments 
in constructing early versions of the regulatory state.33  At first, federal 
courts resisted these changes, but eventually rationalized and legitimated 
them in a series of landmark decisions that are now foundational to modern 
constitutional law.34  But such judicial decisions are only the tip of the ice-
berg.  We should understand these changes—and living constitutionalism 
itself—both as a series of doctrines and as a set of new laws and institutions 




32  Cf. Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-
Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 294 (1957) (arguing that the “main task of the Court is to confer legitimacy on 
the fundamental policies of the successful coalition”). 
33  Howard Gillman, The Collapse of Constitutional Originalism and the Rise of the Notion of the 
“Living Constitution” in the Course of American State-Building, 11 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 191 (1997). 
34  See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding regulation of wholly intrastate, 
noncommercial activity if such activity, viewed in the aggregate, would have a substantial effect on in-
terstate commerce); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (holding that Congress can regulate 
employment in manufacturing under the Commerce Clause); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 
548 (1937) (upholding the unemployment compensation provisions of the Social Security Act of 1935); 
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations 
Act). 
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quired adjusting older constitutional doctrines to explain and justify these 
changes in how governments governed.35 
Landmark precedents like the New Deal decisions became durable pre-
cisely because so much of the developing structure of governance depended 
on their construction of the Constitution.  This is the central insight of liv-
ing constitutionalism: state-building by the political branches and judicial 
constructions are, generally speaking, mutually productive and mutually 
supportive.  To use the metaphor of the living constitution, they grow up 
together.  That is why the New Deal precedents are durable.  We have not 
built upon them because we think they are correct; we think they are correct 
because we have built so much upon them. 
The example of the New Deal is hardly exceptional.  Living constitu-
tionalism is usually as much the product of the political branches (including 
administrative agencies and state and local governments) and changing so-
cial and cultural practices as it is the product of federal judicial decisions.  
Social and political movements express values and press for change both in 
culture and in politics.  The political branches create new laws and institu-
tions, and courts make sense of these constructions.  Courts also ratify 
changes in social mores and institutional practices, some of which are al-
ready reflected in new laws and institutions, or in the abolition and reform 
of older ones.  The sexual revolution and the movement for women’s libera-
tion are two obvious examples of how constitutional change is prefigured 
by changes in civil society.  Courts can usually do little to block widespread 
cultural change.  Courts may slow down drastic political change in the short 
run, especially if their members were appointed by different parties or in 
different regimes; but generally they rationalize and authorize these changes 
over time.  The political branches, in turn, continue to build out the state 
based on the justifications offered by the Judiciary. 
The New Deal Court legitimated the creation of the administrative and 
welfare state, particularly after Franklin Roosevelt was able to appoint new 
Justices.  It did so by reinterpreting and expanding federal and state power 
to regulate the economy and engage in redistributive programs, and by cre-
ating new procedures to rationalize the expansion of administrative agen-
cies.  The members of the Warren Court were largely in sync with the 
bipartisan liberal coalition that emerged in the 1960s.  It upheld new federal 




35  In his model of constitutional change, Bruce Ackerman originally treated the key Supreme Court 
decisions of the New Deal as “amendment analogues” which amended the Constitution outside of Arti-
cle V.  1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).  In his more recent work, he has 
come to see constitutional amendments arising out of an interaction between what he calls “superprece-
dents” and “landmark statutes” like the National Labor Relations Act and the Social Security Act.  See 
Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou, Canonizing the Civil Rights Revolution: The People and the Poll Tax, 
103 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 65, 67-69, 83, 86-88, 108-109, 124 (2009); Ackerman, supra note 31, at 1750–
53.  My view is that these achievements of twentieth-century constitutionalism are constitutional con-
structions, not constitutional amendments. 
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and brought regional majorities (especially in the South) in line with the 
dominant liberal values of national politics in the 1960s.36  After the politi-
cal mood of the country changed, the Rehnquist Court cooperated with the 
ascendant conservative movement, promoting state regulatory autonomy 
and making it easier for government to support majority religions.37 
When courts exercise judicial review to strike down laws, they often 
work in cooperation with the dominant national political coalition.  They 
impose its values on regional and local majorities; and they strike down 
statutes passed by older regimes that are inconsistent with the current coali-
tion’s values.38  When most states have adopted a social policy, courts tend 
to ratify these dominant values in new constitutional constructions.  Thus, 
the Court decided Brown v. Board of Education39 only after most states had 




36  See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 214–15, 490–94 (2000) 
[hereinafter POWE, THE WARREN COURT]; Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitu-
tional Theory, 90 VA. L. REV. 1537, 1538–46 (2004); Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Politics Of American Ju-
dicial Review: Reflections on the Marshall, Warren, and Rehnquist Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
697, 719–20 (2003).  As Keith Whittington notes, the Warren Court’s legislative reapportionment deci-
sions were welcomed by liberals who believed that as cities grew larger, legislative malapportionment 
favored more conservative rural voters over more liberal urban voters.  KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, 
POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 127 (2007). 
37  See cases cited infra notes 68, 69; see also Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 
356 (2001) (Eleventh Amendment barred damage suits against states for violations of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (Eleventh Amendment barred 
damage suits against states for violations of Age Discrimination in Employment Act); United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down a section of the Violence Against Women Act as beyond 
Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment); Alden 
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (expanding state sovereign immunity from damage suits under the Tenth 
Amendment); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that, under the Tenth Amendment, 
the federal government may not compel state executive officials to administer a federal regulatory pro-
gram); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to legis-
lation passed under Congress’s Commerce Power); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) 
(striking down ban on guns near public schools as beyond Congress’s powers under the Commerce 
Clause); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that, under the Tenth Amendment, 
the federal government may not compel state legislatures to enact a regulatory program). 
38  See WHITTINGTON, supra note 36, at 105–20 (showing the different ways that the Supreme Court 
enforces the values of the existing regime); see also Balkin, supra note 36, at 1538–46 (explaining how 
the Court enforces the dominant coalition’s values against outliers); Dahl, supra note 32, at 293 (arguing 
that the Supreme Court is more likely to invalidate old statutes that no longer reflected the preferences 
of then-current majorities); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolu-
tions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 16–18 (1996) (same).  For accounts of how judicial decisionmaking responds to 
national popular opinion, see BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (forthcoming 2009) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE]; 
TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 80–132 (1999); Barry Friedman, Medi-
ated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2601–13 (2003). 
39  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
40  See Balkin, supra note 36, at 1539–40.  See generally MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO 
CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 173–96 (2004) (de-
scribing broader changes in legal understandings concerning race following World War II) 
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Texas41 protected the rights of homosexuals under the Due Process Clause 
only after the vast majority of states had decriminalized sodomy and new 
attitudes about homosexuality had swept the country.42 
Just as courts cooperate with the dominant national coalition, national 
politicians have regularly buttressed and supported the institution of judicial 
review and the Judiciary’s work of constitutional construction.  Keith Whit-
tington points out that only a small number of Presidents have openly re-
sisted the Supreme Court’s ability to interpret the Constitution,43 and these 
arguments generally cease as soon as these Presidents have placed like-
minded jurists on the bench.44  Most Presidents have actively supported ju-
dicial review, or at least have seen it as a better choice than the alternatives.  
In fact, Presidents have regularly delegated constitutional constructions and 
even substantial amounts of policymaking to the courts.45 
Although Presidents routinely assert their right to interpret the Consti-
tution in the normal exercise of their powers, they hardly ever compete with 
the courts for final authority over the Constitution’s meaning except in rare 
historical circumstances: This occurs when a new President like Thomas 
Jefferson or Franklin Roosevelt seeks to repudiate a previous and discred-
ited constitutional regime and faces a Judiciary controlled by adherents of 
the old order.46  The attack on judicial authority, however, is only tempo-
rary.  As soon as the President can stock the Judiciary with ideological al-
lies, presidential challenges to the courts generally cease because the courts 
generally support and legitimate what the President is doing.47  As a result, 
Whittington explains, “Presidents and political leaders have generally pre-
ferred that the Court take the responsibility for securing constitutional fidel-
ity.”48 
When Presidents like Harry Truman or Martin Van Buren are affiliated 
with the existing constitutional regime of their predecessors (Franklin Roo-
sevelt, Andrew Jackson) and try to further its goals, they usually face a 
court already stocked with political allies.  Hence they generally support the 
federal courts’ powers of judicial review and constitutional construction.  In 




41  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
42  WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 130, 139, 168, 
app. B2 (1999); Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 
443–45 (2005). 
43  WHITTINGTON, supra note 36, at 23. 
44  Mark A. Graber, The Countermajoritiarian Difficulty: From Courts to Congress to Constitutional 
Order, 4 ANN. REV. LAW SOC. SCI. 361, 366–67 (2008). 
45  WHITTINGTON, supra note 36, at 21–27, 82–160, 287–92. 
46  Id. at 22–23. 
47  Graber, supra note 44, at 366–67. 
48  WHITTINGTON, supra note 36, at xi. 
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values against political outliers and local and regional majorities.49  Lyndon 
Johnson strongly supported the Warren Court for precisely this reason. 
Finally, when Presidents (like Bill Clinton, Richard Nixon, or Grover 
Cleveland) face a hostile political environment and/or a Congress controlled 
by the other party, they usually find that it is better to ally themselves with 
the power of the courts to restrain Congress and protect their prerogatives 
than to try to challenge two different branches at the same time.  In difficult 
political environments “the law and the judiciary may be the best defense 
that a president has.”50  
As Mark Graber puts it succinctly, “[a]n institution that routinely pro-
motes presidential ambitions is no more countermajoritarian than the presi-
dency” itself.51  And even during the rare moments when the President 
attacks judicial authority, important parts of the national political coalition, 
including members of Congress, often support the courts against the Presi-
dent, because they prefer judicial construction to complete presidential con-
trol over constitutional meaning.52 
Courts, however, do not merely reflect the views of political elites.  
They are active participants in the national political coalition of their era.  
For example, they may tilt toward one wing of the coalition (usually the 
Presidency) in favor of another.  Perhaps more importantly, faced with 
rapid changes in basic assumptions or governing practices, courts generally 
act as conservators of past constitutional values: they slow down and tem-
porize change until ascendant forces have shown sustained support over 
time.  Then, partly as a result of changed political circumstances and partly 
as a result of new judicial appointments, courts make sense of and rational-
ize the new regime, working out the details in new constitutional doctrines.  
As noted previously, they bring stragglers and outliers—usually local and 
regional majorities—in line with the constitutional views of the newly 
dominant national political coalition.  In this way, the federal judicial sys-
tem as a whole acts as an enforcer of national values in a federal republic.  
The doctrines that federal courts create, in turn, affect future political prac-
tice both in the states and at the national level: They shape political agendas 
and assumptions about what is politically legitimate and politically possible 
that later political mobilizations build on, develop, or react to. 
These institutional features significantly constrain the direction of judi-
cial construction.  That is why, in practice, living constitutionalism does not 
give judges unfettered discretion.  It is not because legal materials prevent 




49  Id. at 105, 117. 
50  Id. at 166–67. 
51  Graber, supra note 44, at 367. 
52  See id. at 368 (“At the very least, a majority in at least one elected branch of the national gov-
ernment has historically thought government by judiciary more attractive politically than presidential 
authority to determine constitutional meanings.”). 
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that, over long periods of time, they can be quite flexible.  Rather, it is be-
cause institutional and structural elements in the political system tend to 
hem in judicial constructions.  These constraints include professional legal 
culture—which demands coherent professional reasoning from case to 
case—the symbiotic relationship between courts and the political branches, 
and above all control of the appointments process by the President and Sen-
ate.53  These factors tend to guarantee that judicial innovations are likely to 
occur only within certain boundaries.  That is why the process of judicial 
construction of doctrine is constrained despite the Constitution’s vague 
clauses and ambiguous silences.  The Constitution’s open-ended language 
may seem indeterminate, but at any point in time it is a constrained inde-
terminacy. 
In sum, living constitutionalism is primarily a theory about the proc-
esses of constitutional development produced by the interaction of the 
courts with the political branches.  It is a descriptive and normative theory 
of the processes of constitutional construction.  It explains how change oc-
curs and it gives an account of why that process is democratically legiti-
mate, or at least more legitimate than the alternatives.  To understand living 
constitutionalism, therefore, we need to understand constitutional construc-
tion.  And we must begin not with courts—which usually react and re-
spond—but with constitutional constructions by the people’s elected 
representatives. 
B. Varieties of Constitutional Construction 
Political actors engage in constitutional construction when they elabo-
rate and enforce constitutional values by creating new institutions, laws, 
and governing practices.  Constitutional construction by political actors 
overlaps with the ordinary processes of policy and lawmaking, and it may 
be futile to try to separate them out in every case.54  A particular piece of 
legislation may simultaneously promote the political agenda of a party and 
implement constitutional values; a new institution may simultaneously 
promote policy goals and flesh out constitutional structures. 
For example, the creation of the various parts of the Executive Branch 
to carry out programs and administer laws is a constitutional construction; 




53  Sanford Levinson and I have advanced a theory of “partisan entrenchment” in the Judiciary as a 
key factor in explaining constitutional change.  See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes 
of Constitutional Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 490–506 (2006) [hereinafter Balkin & Levinson, Constitutional Change]; 
Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 
1045, 1066–83 (2001). 
54  See WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 29, at 5–6, 107–12. 
55  See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92–93 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 503 (1994)) (creating the office of the Attorney General).  Congress did not provide the Attorney Gen-
eral with a clerk until 1818.  See Act of April 20, 1818, ch. 87, § 6, 3 Stat. 445, 447. 
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Department of Justice) to advise the President on legal matters and to de-
fend the government in court.56  The construction of the National Security 
State in the late 1940s and early 1950s involved the reorganization of the 
armed forces, the creation of the Department of Defense, the National Secu-
rity Council, the Central Intelligence Agency and other institutions for sur-
veillance and intelligence gathering,57 a permanent standing army, and the 
dispersal of American troops throughout the globe.  These innovations had 
constitutional overtones: they changed expectations about how and when 
Congress and the President would use military force and exert influence 
overseas. 
Political actors also engage in constitutional construction when their 
decisions and actions create precedents for constitutionally permissible ac-
tivities, like the Louisiana Purchase, the First and Second Banks of the 
United States, or the creation of the Federal Reserve System.  Political ac-
tors can also create precedents about what is not constitutionally permitted, 
like understandings about when filibusters may be used, when laws or 
budget appropriations may be kept secret, or the proper grounds for im-
peachment.58  Some of the most important constitutional constructions cre-
ate precedents by articulating constitutional values in new legislation or 
new institutions, like Congress’s passage of New Deal legislation, its crea-
tion of a national bank, or independent federal agencies.  Each of these rein-
terpreted the scope and reach of federal powers. 
Political actors also engage in constitutional construction when they 
create or modify constitutional norms and understandings.  Examples in-
clude whether it is permissible for the President to veto legislation based on 
policy disagreement or only constitutional objections, what practical stan-
dards Congress will use for impeachments, and how much deference Con-
gress should give to cabinet and judicial nominations.  Sometimes 
constitutional construction involves filling in constitutional silences through 
constitutional practice, like the decision to adopt first-past-the-post voting 
systems, or secret ballots. 
Some constitutional construction involves forging compromises be-
tween different parts of the federal government—or between the states and 
the federal government—about their respective duties, obligations, and pre-
rogatives.  These compromises may lead to new understandings about fed-




56  Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 501, 503, 509 
note (1994)).  This Act also created the office of the Solicitor General.  Id. at § 2. 
57  National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 253, ch. 343, 61 Stat. 495 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.) (reorganizing the military and intelligence services and creating the De-
partment of Defense, the National Security Council, and the Central Intelligence Agency). 
58  See WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION, supra note 29, at 65–71 (discussing con-
structions arising from the failed impeachment of Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase). 
59  See BRUCE ACKERMAN & DAVID GOLOVE, IS NAFTA CONSTITUTIONAL? (1995) (describing the 
rise of the use of congressional-executive agreements); WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
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government struggle with each other, push back at each other, and develop 
new expectations, they construct new constitutional norms or modify old 
ones.  Examples might include the multiple compromises about protective 
tariffs during the antebellum era, the admission of states to the union, and 
the regulation of slavery in the territories.  More recent examples are the 
President’s increasing authority to initiate legislation and control the budg-
eting process, the creation of a vast range of classified intelligence activities 
with secret budgets to pay for them and secret regulations to govern them, 
and the change in relative authority between Congress and the President in 
the conduct of foreign affairs and the use of military force. 
The political branches build out the Constitution through everyday 
politics—passing legislation, issuing regulations, striking political deals.  In 
addition, constitutional culture and constitutional understandings evolve 
through arguments and mobilizations occurring in ordinary politics.  This 
means that in practice it is useless to try to draw clear boundaries between 
activities that in hindsight we would label constitutional construction and 
ordinary political activity.  Potentially almost all political and governmental 
activity could be constitutional construction.  Often we may only know 
what counts later on when institutions become settled and practices and 
precedents become established.  The very notion of constitutional construc-
tion involves an interpretive understanding of previous political activity as 
helping to build out the Constitution and its related institutions. 
For example, Congress engages in construction when it passes laws 
that interpret the Constitution.  However, every Congressional enactment 
passed under the commerce power, and every appropriation under the Gen-
eral Welfare Clause, involves an implicit interpretation of these clauses, 
whether or not any court ever considers them.  Every appointment of an in-
ferior officer, indeed, even the purchase of a new stapler in a regional office 
of the Social Security Administration presumes the political power to act.  
Should we regard all of these activities as constitutional constructions?  As 
an interpretive matter, we would not, if the legality of these practices seems 
clearly established.  The purchase of the stapler presumes constitutional 
power to act, but the activity now seems routine as opposed to a practice of 
institution-building. 
Nevertheless, the continuous repetition of actions and tasks believed to 
be uncontroversially authorized (and self-conscious forbearance from ac-
tions generally believed to be unconstitutional) is not unimportant.  It helps 
reproduce expectations about the authority of constitutional constructions 
and helps make constitutional constructions durable over time.  The every-
day activities of administrative agencies or the institutions of national secu-
rity continuously enmesh these constitutional constructions in lived political 
experience; they reproduce understandings and expectations about their 
                                                                                                                 
CONSTRUCTION, supra note 29, at 20–71, 113–57, 162–201 (describing controversies over impeach-
ment, budgeting, and national security). 
103:549  (2009) Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution 
 569
continued existence and their continued authority.  Long-lived constitu-
tional constructions—like those involved in the regulatory state or the na-
tional security state—are not simply established in a single moment.  They 
are repeatedly performed in practice, and expectations about them are con-
tinuously reproduced in constitutional culture, confirming and reinforcing 
their durable character. 
It follows that even minuscule tasks and quotidian legislation could in 
theory contribute to constitutional construction if they help forge new un-
derstandings of the relative powers of the different branches or of the fed-
eral and state governments under the Constitution.  The President’s power, 
for example, has sometimes increased by slow accretion over two centuries.  
Expectations about what Presidents and their Administrations can do (and 
must do) have expanded through a series of acts great and small, some of 
which were actively challenged but most of which were not.  In hindsight, 
we might see the collection of these activities as part of a long-term process 
of constitutional construction of the Executive Branch. 
In like fashion, the everyday micropractices of race relations, gender 
roles, and sexuality in civil society cumulatively may change the public’s 
attitudes about the cultural meaning of equality; in turn, this may reshape 
the American people’s understandings of equal protection and constitution-
ally protected liberty.  In hindsight, these practices may form part of—or 
significantly influence—a long-term practice of constitutional construction. 
In sum, it is best not to worry too much about where constitutional 
construction leaves off and merely ordinary politics begins.  The key point, 
rather, is to recognize how practices within the constitutional scheme can 
subtly adjust the scheme itself in addition to the formal processes of consti-
tutional amendment. 
C. The Role of Courts in Constitutional Construction 
Courts also build institutions through creating the Judiciary’s adminis-
trative structure, and through developing rules of standing, justiciability, 
evidence, and procedure.60  But perhaps the most important role of federal 
courts in the system of constitutional construction is legitimating and ra-
tionalizing the work of the national political process and its constitutional 
constructions.  Federal courts are part of the national political process, and 
they are players in the dominant national coalition of their time.  Generally 
speaking, living constitutionalism by courts is a process of doctrinal con-
struction that rationalizes and supplements constitutional constructions by 
the political branches and responds to changes in political and cultural val-




60  See PAUL FRYMER, BLACK AND BLUE: AFRICAN AMERICANS, THE LABOR MOVEMENT, AND THE 
DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY 70–97 (2008) (describing twentieth-century creation of the “Le-
gal State,” which enforces rights through building up judicial procedures and remedies). 
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Congress and the President do, their constitutional constructions are usually 
more cooperative than competitive. 
Courts engage in constitutional construction in several different ways.  
First, courts rationalize new constitutional constructions by the political 
branches through creating new doctrines.  Rationalization has a dual mean-
ing.  On the one hand, it means providing reasons why the constructions are 
faithful to the Constitution; on the other, it means subjecting these construc-
tions to reasons—articulating rules and principles of judgment—that will 
presumably be binding on the political branches in the future.  Rationaliza-
tion is thus both a form of legitimation and a form of policing.  Courts ex-
press and articulate the constitutional norms and values of the dominant 
national coalition in constitutional doctrine and thereby help justify them.  
They re-describe political values in terms of legal rules and principles that 
will apply to future cases.  They synthesize new values and institutions with 
the past by reinterpreting the past constitutional commitments of previous 
generations, showing how what the political branches are doing is actually 
faithful both to the Constitution and to the past.  To do this, courts may de-
scribe past commitments in new ways or at a higher level of generality, of-
ten drawing on the entire history of readings of the Constitution by political 
and judicial actors. 
In giving reasons and synthesizing present with past, courts also set 
boundaries on what the political branches can do.  Thus, the process of ra-
tionalization is Janus-faced.  It justifies constitutional construction by the 
political branches, but that justification comes with a price: The courts re-
quire the political branches to act within a set of principles, rules, and rea-
sons that courts construct in order to maintain their legitimacy and the 
legitimacy of the political system. 
Many of the most important decisions of the federal courts rationalize 
constructions by the political branches in precisely this way: They make 
sense of them and legitimate them while subjecting them to legal authority 
created by courts, which, in turn, legitimates these actions and similar ac-
tions politicians may take in the future.  Thus, following the New Deal the 
Supreme Court responded to the passage of the Social Security Act, the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, and other legislation by upholding these new asser-
tions of federal power.  It legitimated the emerging regulatory and welfare 
state that had already been created in politics, and gave doctrinal explana-




61  See, e.g., United States v. Darby 312 U.S. 100, 119–20 (1941) (Congress may regulate activities 
which have a substantial impact on interstate commerce); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 
144, 152 (1938) (legislation will be upheld under the Due Process Clause if it has a rational basis); 
Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589–92 (1937) (use of federal funds to induce state partici-
pation in unemployment compensation scheme did not violate the Tenth Amendment where it did not 
unduly coerce states to participate and states were free to end participation). 
103:549  (2009) Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution 
 571
Administrative Procedure Act,62 in turn, helped articulate the values of due 
process and the relationship of Article III courts to the explosion of federal 
administrative agencies.  During the civil rights revolution the Court upheld 
new civil rights statutes, once again explaining why Congress’s actions 
were permissible and establishing how future civil rights laws would be 
judged.  Many of the landmark decisions of American constitutional his-
tory, from McCulloch v. Maryland63 to Katzenbach v. Morgan,64 have this 
dual character.  Over time, courts work out the logical consequences of the 
value commitments of the new regime as well as its landmark precedents 
and synthesize them with the work of previous regimes, making them ap-
pear as coherent as possible.  
Second, as noted previously, federal courts cooperate with the domi-
nant forces in national politics by policing and disciplining those who do 
not share the dominant coalition’s values.  Much federal judicial review is 
directed at state and local government officials.  Courts take on the task of 
articulating and applying the values of the dominant national coalition, im-
posing the values of national majorities on regional or local majorities.  
These decisions are countermajoritarian only from a local or regional per-
spective. 
Brown v. Board of Education and Lawrence v. Texas are two exam-
ples.  Brown required Southern majorities to accept the constitutional values 
of the dominant North; Lawrence required the remaining thirteen states to 
decriminalize same-sex sodomy.  The Supreme Court often looks to the di-
rection of change in state practices to determine the meaning of vague 
clauses like the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause.  Not surprisingly, disputes in these cases often turn on whether the 
Court has adequately recognized a genuine trend, and whether the trend 
marks a truly enduring constitutional value or merely reflects a temporary 
and revisable policy preference.65 
Along the same lines, courts apply vague clauses and fill in gaps and 
silences in the Constitution in response to long term changes in social atti-
tudes that have become reflected in national politics.  During the sexual 
revolution, for example, the federal courts promoted liberal values by loos-




62  Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 404, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–06 (1994)). 
63  17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
64  384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
65  See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S.Ct. 2641 (2008) (holding that a statute that prescribed the 
death penalty for rape of a child under twelve years of age is unconstitutional); compare id. at 2657–58 
(concluding that there is a national consensus against the death penalty in these circumstances), with id. 
at 2665–67, 2672–73 (Alito, J., dissenting) (denying the existence of consensus and arguing that the 
trend might even be in the opposite direction). 
66  See, e.g., Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (declaring facially invalid an ordinance 
making it a public nuisance and a punishable offense for a drive-in movie theater to exhibit films con-
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ried couples and single persons to use contraceptives.67  After social and re-
ligious conservatives began to dominate American politics in the 1980s, the 
Supreme Court revised its Establishment Clause doctrines, making it easier 
for governments to support religious schools and create voucher programs.68  
It interpreted the Free Speech Clause to allow private religious groups to 
hold prayer services after hours in public schools and to engage in religious 
expression on government property.69  
Third, federal courts cooperate with the national political coalition by 
limiting or striking down laws that reflect an older coalition’s values.  The 
Rehnquist Court’s federalism revolution is an example.  Following the Re-
publican takeover of Congress in 1995, the Rehnquist Court began to pro-
mote state sovereignty and devolution in line with the views of the 
Congress led by House Speaker Newt Gingrich.  It also began to limit or 
strike down civil rights statutes passed by the previous Democratic-
controlled Congress, including parts of the 1994 Violence Against Women 
Act, which had been passed just before the Republican takeover.70  People 
often point to Dred Scott v. Sandford71 as a rare example of the Supreme 
Court holding a federal law unconstitutional in the period before the Civil 
War.72  Not surprisingly, it invalidated an older law: The Missouri Com-
promise of 1820, a statute that reflected an older set of political assumptions 
about slavery that had been repealed by Congress in the Compromise of 
1850.73 
                                                                                                                 
taining nudity, when the screen is visible from a public street or place); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 
(1973) (announcing a three-part test for obscenity); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding 
that mere possession of obscene materials cannot be a crime); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 
(1966) (holding that a book with literary value was not legally obscene). 
67  See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (striking down a prohibition of 
distribution of contraceptives to minors); Eisenstadt v. Baird 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that the right 
of reproductive privacy extended to single as well as married persons); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down a state law that prohibited the dispensing or use of birth control devices 
to or by married couples). 
68  See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding voucher scheme for private 
schools under the Establishment Clause); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality opinion) 
(upholding direct government aid in materials and equipment to religious schools); Agostini v. Felton, 
521 U.S. 203 (1997) (holding that a federally funded program providing instruction to disadvantaged 
children in parochial schools did not violate Establishment Clause); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. 
Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (holding that the Establishment Clause did not prevent a school district from 
furnishing a student with a sign-language interpreter to facilitate his education at a sectarian school). 
69  See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visi-
tors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 
U.S. 384 (1993). 
70  See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) 
71  60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
72  In fact, the practice was more common than generally supposed.  See Mark A. Graber, Naked 
Land Transfers and American Constitutional Development, 53 VAND. L. REV. 73, 78, 116–17 (2000).  
73  See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 452. 
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Fourth, federal courts cooperate with the national political coalition by 
taking responsibility—and thus the political heat—for decisions that mem-
bers of the dominant coalition cannot agree on and that would potentially 
split the coalition.74  Decisions on abortion and Internet pornography are re-
cent examples.  Moderate and conservative politicians, particularly in the 
Republican Party, may want to avoid casting votes that would criminalize 
abortion entirely; Roe v. Wade75 takes that question off the table.  Instead, 
they are perfectly happy to cast votes limiting abortion funding, late term 
abortions, or partial-birth abortions, because these policies are popular both 
with moderates and with conservatives.  Some moderate and liberal politi-
cians, particularly in the Democratic Party, may not want to be blamed for 
opposing the criminalization of Internet pornography, but are happy to have 
the courts strike such measures down.76  In this way, the Court promotes 
their values while taking legal responsibility for the outcome. 
Fifth, the Supreme Court often takes direction about how to construct 
doctrine from contemporaneous expressions of constitutional values by po-
litical majorities.  I have already noted the Roosevelt Court’s legitimation 
of the New Deal: The Supreme Court upheld the National Labor Relations 
Act in 1937;77 that same year in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish78 it applied the 
values of the New Deal coalition to uphold state minimum wage legislation.  
During the 1960s, the Warren Court took direction from the national politi-
cal process to further the civil rights revolution.  Bruce Ackerman and Jen-
nifer Nou have pointed out that following the ratification of the Twenty-
Fourth Amendment, which banned poll taxes in federal elections, Section 
10 of the 1965 Voting Rights Act urged the Attorney General to challenge 




74  WHITTINGTON, supra note 36, at 134–38; Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Leg-
islative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993). 
75  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
76  See Keith Whittington, “Interpose Your Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the Exercise of 
Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583, 591 (2005).  In or-
der to ensure passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, a reform he greatly desired, President Clin-
ton acquiesced to the addition of the Communications Decency Act (CDA), which made it a crime to 
make available on the Internet indecent material that minors might be able to access.  Although both the 
Justice Department and the Clinton Administration argued that the measure was unconstitutional, Presi-
dent Clinton signed the bill anyway.  As one Administration official put it, “No way are you going to get 
yourself in a position where the President isn’t willing to go as far as a Democratic Senator in restricting 
child pornography on the Internet in an election year.”  Id.  The bill, however, also provided for expe-
dited judicial review of the CDA, and after a three-judge district court initially struck it down, the Su-
preme Court declared it unconstitutional in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).  This gave President 
Clinton and certain members of Congress who voted for the bill the best of both worlds; they got credit 
for getting tough with Internet pornography while letting the Court protect First Amendment values they 
shared. 
77  NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
78  300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
79  Ackerman & Nou, supra note 35, at 108–09. 
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the political branches, the Warren Court held these taxes unconstitutional in 
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections.80   
The Supreme Court’s sex equality decisions provide an even more 
powerful example.  During the 1960s, Congress passed a series of acts 
promoting gender equality, including the Equal Pay Act, Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the 1972 Amendments to Title VII, culminat-
ing in passage of an Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) sent to the states in 
1972.  The Supreme Court recited this history in Frontiero v. Richardson, 
offering it as a reason why sex discrimination violated the Equal Protection 
Clause even before the ERA was ratified.81  In fact, the Court’s develop-
ment of sex equality doctrine under the Equal Protection Clause made the 
ERA largely superfluous.  Even so, these doctrines followed the judgments 
of Congress and the President that sex discrimination already violated con-
stitutional values, as well as large-scale changes in public attitudes about 
sex equality.  More recently, after Congress and the President passed a ban 
on so-called partial birth abortions, the Supreme Court upheld the Partial 
Birth Abortion Act of 2003, effectively reversing a seven-year-old decision 
striking down similar laws.82  In each of these examples, judicial construc-
tions either ratified or meshed with recent constitutional constructions of-
fered by the President and Congress. 
Critics of the federal Judiciary often complain that judges are elites 
who are influenced by elite values.83  This is certainly true.  But it is also 
true of the political elites who operate the national political process.  Both 
sets of elites respond to changes in national public opinion, but both sets 
also favor elite values to the extent that they differ from the values of non-
elites.84  When political elites are liberal, as they were in the mid-1960s, the 
work of courts will also tend to be more liberal; when political elites are 
more conservative, as they were in the late twentieth century, the work of 
courts will tend to shift to the right.  Complaints about federal judicial deci-




80  383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
81  Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687–88 (1973) (plurality opinion) (“Congress itself has 
concluded that classifications based upon sex are inherently invidious, and this conclusion of a coequal 
branch of Government is not without significance to the question presently under consideration.”). 
82  Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding federal Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003 
and distinguishing Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (striking down a state law banning partial 
birth abortion)). 
83  See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE 
LAW 8, 16–18 (1990); cf. John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial 
Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 369 (1999) (“[H]owever well motivated [judges] may be, they 
are likely to bring to their work the perceptions of an upper middle class, educated, largely male, and 
largely white elite.”). 
84  See LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW 
GILDED AGE 285–86 (2008) (affluent citizens have disproportionate impact on social policy outcomes, 
while “the preferences of persons in the bottom third of the income distribution have no apparent impact 
on the behavior of their elected officials”). 
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eralism—they reflect complaints by representatives of regional majorities 
(and regional elites) about the contrasting values of the national political 
coalition.  Conversely, although judicial doctrine tends to stay in sync with 
the views of national political elites, in some cases these political elites are 
actually less responsive to changes in national public opinion than the fed-
eral Judiciary because of the many veto points in the political system.  For 
instance, seniority and voting rules in the Senate prevented federal civil 
rights legislation for generations despite popular support for reform; Brown 
v. Board of Education responded to changing views about race following 
World War II in ways that Congress could not until the middle of the 
1960s.85 
D. Constitutional Constructions and 
Constitutional Revolutions 
A similar analysis applies to constitutional revolutions.  Lawyers may 
associate these transformations with famous court decisions, but they gen-
erally involve significant cooperation between courts and the national po-
litical branches.  Twentieth-century constitutional revolutions, like the New 
Deal revolution of the 1930s or the civil rights revolution of the 1960s, have 
not primarily been led by the federal Judiciary.  Rather, they have mostly 
been judicial responses to changes in reigning political coalitions and in the 
values of the dominant regime in American politics.  During the early years 
of the New Deal the Supreme Court mostly resisted changing political and 
constitutional assumptions, leading President Roosevelt to make increas-
ingly broad and sweeping claims about federal power to regulate the econ-
omy.  The New Deal “revolution” consisted largely of the Supreme Court’s 
decision to get behind the emerging political realities and cooperate with 
the political branches and especially with the President’s program.  Al-
though Roosevelt attacked the Court when it disagreed with him, he largely 
stopped attacking it—and its powers of judicial review—as soon as the 
Court began to agree with and cooperate with his Administration.  Once 
Roosevelt had stocked the Supreme Court with friends of the New Deal, the 
Court responded with a series of precedents legitimating and rationalizing 
the new constitutional regime and constructing a new constitutional com-
mon sense about federalism and economic regulation.86 
The Warren Court, by contrast, needed little prodding to act in concert 




85  KLARMAN, supra note 40, at 366 (noting that southern filibusters had blocked civil rights legisla-
tion between the 1920s and the 1957 Civil Rights Act); Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Mod-
ern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48, 93–94 (2000) (“[F]rom the 1920s through the 1950s, the 
Supreme Court probably was a better gauge of national opinion on race than was a United States Con-
gress in which white supremacist southern Democrats enjoyed disproportionate power because of Senate 
seniority and filibuster rules.”). 
86  See cases cited supra note 34. 
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the Supreme Court had been stocked with Justices who were liberal on ra-
cial issues, reflecting the dominance of racial liberals in the Presidential 
wings of both parties.87  The Truman Administration had already desegre-
gated the armed forces and pushed for civil rights in 1948, and asked the 
Justices to overrule Plessy v. Ferguson88 in 1950.89  In 1954 the Court re-
sponded in Brown v. Board of Education.  A regional majority in the South 
blocked any congressional action on racial segregation, but a national ma-
jority favored the result in Brown, as did foreign policy elites.90  Brown was 
not an example of a Court striking out on its own against the wishes of ma-
jorities; it was an example of a Court that sided with key elements of the 
dominant national political coalition and with national political elites. 
In the 1960s a liberal Democratic President, Lyndon Johnson, led a 
coalition of political liberals and moderates in both parties to enact an ambi-
tious civil rights agenda, passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.  The Supreme Court 
strove to uphold the new civil rights legislation from constitutional chal-
lenge, expanded Congressional powers to protect civil rights, and struck 
down state poll taxes after Congress requested it do so in the 1965 Voting 
Rights Act.91  The Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolution imposed 
national standards of fairness on state and local law enforcement officials 
whose practices disproportionately burdened blacks and the poor.92  As 
Congress and the President began a War on Poverty, the Court began con-




87  See, e.g., KEVIN J. MCMAHON, RECONSIDERING ROOSEVELT ON RACE: HOW THE PRESIDENCY 
PAVED THE ROAD TO BROWN (2004) (arguing that Franklin Roosevelt deliberately appointed judges 
deferential to presidential power and receptive to civil rights claims, especially when made by the Ex-
ecutive).  
88  163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
89  KLARMAN, supra note 40, at 210.  The Justice Department made this request in a trio of cases de-
cided in 1950.  See Brief for the United States at 35–49, Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 
(1950) (No. 25); Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9–14, McLaurin v. Oklahoma 
State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (No. 34); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
90  Balkin, supra note 36, at 1539; KLARMAN, supra note 40, at 344–45, 445; see MARY DUDZIAK, 
COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 80–81 (2000); GERALD 
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 42 (1991). 
91  Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); see also Ackerman & Nou, supra note 35. 
92  POWE, THE WARREN COURT, supra note 36, at 492 (arguing that the Warren Court’s criminal 
procedure decisions imposed national standards on local and state police officers, prosecutors, and 
judges); Klarman, supra note 38, at 60–66 (connecting the Warren Court’s criminal procedure revolu-
tion to changing attitudes about poverty); cf. Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero?  
Rethinking the Warren Court's Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 
1451 (2004) (arguing that Warren Court decisions reflected shifts in national public opinion and chang-
ing attitudes about police misconduct, race, poverty, and perceived rates of crime). 
93  See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that due process requires a hearing before 
the termination of welfare benefits); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (striking down, on 
equal protection grounds, a statute that denied welfare benefits to residents who had not been in the ju-
risdiction for at least one year); Harper, 383 U.S. 663 (striking down poll tax in state elections). 
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passed a revolutionary new immigration act in 1965, the Court protected 
resident aliens from discrimination by state governments.94 
The twentieth century’s constitutional revolutions have largely been 
revolutions in constitutional construction.  They have involved alterations 
in constitutional common sense produced through political mobilization and 
judicial cooperation.  Constitutional revolutions are changes in expectations 
about what constitutional provisions mean and how they are likely to be ap-
plied; changes in what kinds of positions are thought reasonable and unrea-
sonable, “off-the-wall” and “on-the-wall.”  These changes are prompted by 
the contemporaneous work of the political branches and by social mobiliza-
tions.  
Most of what courts do in constitutional construction is normal science, 
working out the consequences of previous commitments and counter-
commitments and reasoning from previous precedents.  During periods of 
significant constitutional change, however, courts face a different task: 
making sense of new political realities, significant shifts in public senti-
ment, and new constitutional constructions created by the political 
branches.  Courts play their supporting role by shifting what is “off-the-
wall” and “on-the-wall” in constitutional doctrines and expectations about 
the likely application of constitutional doctrines.  They do this in order to 
make sense of the facts on the ground created in ordinary politics.  Key 
questions of judicial construction concern whether and how to legitimate 
changes or innovations in statecraft and whether and how to cooperate with 
parts of the national political coalition, particularly the Presidency.  How 
courts react will depend on their composition: who appointed their mem-
bers and when they were appointed. 
Courts are by nature conserving if not conservative institutions; their 
composition tends to reflect the political values of the time their various 
members were appointed.  For this reason sometimes courts will resist sig-
nificant changes in governing assumptions promoted by the President or 
Congress. They will ally themselves with those parts of the national politi-
cal coalition that oppose change.  The Judiciary acts as a check on the po-
litical branches, just as Congress and the President check each other.  This 
checking function occurs not because courts are wiser than the political 
branches, but because of their institutional configuration: judges are ap-
pointed by politicians from the past and they decide cases based on past 
precedents and prior conventions.  Nevertheless, in successful constitutional 
transformations like the New Deal, advocates of change maintain political 
power and eventually stock the courts with their allies.  At this point, courts 
begin to cooperate, and they resume their standard function: they legitimate 
and rationalize new constitutional constructions by the political branches, 
and they impose norms of procedural regularity and new forms of civil lib-




94  Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
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will not uphold everything the national political process does, but they will 
uphold the major aspects of the new regime’s program and articulate its 
values in judicial decisions.  These doctrinal developments cannot be ex-
plained solely as the normal or ordinary working out of the details of previ-
ous doctrines, particularly when old judges are replaced by newer judges 
who are more in sync with the dominant national coalition.  These new 
judges reject a significant amount of previous assumptions, remaking con-
stitutional common sense. 
To respond to changes in the national political process, courts may 
have to discard a substantial proportion of existing doctrine.  They must 
create new rights and powers where none existed before, overrule existing 
decisions, or distinguish them into irrelevance.  Courts do this by ascending 
to the general—by going back to first principles and rearticulating those 
higher order principles in a new way.  In West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,95 for 
example, the Supreme Court cast a skeptical eye on an entire generation of 
due process jurisprudence: 
[T]he violation alleged by those attacking minimum wage regulation for 
women is deprivation of freedom of contract.  What is this freedom?  The 
Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract.  It speaks of liberty and 
prohibits the deprivation of liberty without due process of law.  In prohibiting 
that deprivation, the Constitution does not recognize an absolute and uncon-
trollable liberty.  Liberty in each of its phases has its history and connotation.  
But the liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organization which requires 
the protection of law against the evils which menace the health, safety, morals, 
and welfare of the people.  Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily 
subject to the restraints of due process, and regulation which is reasonable in 
relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due 
process.96 
Here, the Court claims fidelity to basic constitutional principles stated 
at a high level of generality.  Claiming fidelity to principles of higher gen-
erality that remain consistent with the text is the easiest way for courts to 
synthesize revolutionary changes in doctrine with past commitments.  Con-
stitutional construction in revolutionary times ascends to the general in or-
der to bless the actual.  Appeals to text and principle allow courts to 
maintain continuity with the past even as their constructions change consid-
erably. 
Basic principles often appear differently to later generations than to 
previous generations that articulated them.  The perspective of later genera-
tions is likely to be different because they stand in a different relation to the 
past. And because later generations see different things in the past, they will 




95  300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
96  Id. at 391. 
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Although constitutional construction by courts involves the articula-
tion, elaboration, and application of constitutional principles, my account of 
constitutional construction differs from Ronald Dworkin’s model of the 
Court’s principled function.  Dworkin’s model of constructive interpretation 
tries to make sense of the whole of past judicial decisions, tempered by the 
best theory of political morality available.97  My model argues that courts 
try to make sense of recent innovations in state-building, redescribing past 
principles and precedents in the process.  The New Deal Court did not try to 
make sense of the entire history of federalism and due process doctrine; 
rather, it tried to shape doctrines to fit new forms of statecraft by the politi-
cal branches. 
Moreover, the principles employed in constitutional construction are 
not limited to those available at the time of adoption.  New constitutional 
principles (e.g., structural principles) can emerge over time as constitutional 
constructions of the text.98  Doctrine consists of a wide variety of different 
principles at different levels of generality and specificity.  New constitu-
tional constructions can be inconsistent with many prior constructions and 
with a wide variety of principles of varying levels in existing doctrine.  For 
example, during the period from 1934 through 1950, the Supreme Court 
largely abandoned an elaborate theory of the scope of state police powers 
that it had developed over a period of seventy years.99  Instead, it con-
structed a new theory of judicial scrutiny for cases involving economic and 
social legislation.100  
My account of constitutional construction has much in common with 
Bruce Ackerman’s theory of constitutional moments, particularly in light of 
his recent revision of the theory to account for the civil rights revolution.101 
Nevertheless, there are six important differences, which produce a different 
account both of constitutional revolutions and of living constitutionalism. 
First, Ackerman’s theory focuses only on the very largest changes in 
constitutional development that produce new constitutional regimes like 
Reconstruction or the New Deal.  In addition, Ackerman’s model of change 
is not gradual, but revolutionary.  Regime changes must occur in a very 
short space of time, normally within ten years.102  Thus, Ackerman’s model 




97  See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 52, 166, 227–28, 255, 265, 363–68 (1986). 
98  See Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 3, at 488–93. 
99  See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA 
POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 10–14, 175–93 (1993). 
100  See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 
(1955); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co, 304 U.S. 144 (1938); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 
U.S. 379 (1937). 
101  Ackerman, supra note 31. 
102  Bruce Ackerman, Revolution on a Human Scale, 108 YALE L.J. 2279, 2287–89 (1999) (propos-
ing a ten-year test for revolutionary change).  This compressed time horizon helps ensure that the 
American people have focused self-consciously on the changes and assented to them. 
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between great regime shifts except to the extent that he can describe these 
changes as the working out of the regime’s larger commitments or as a syn-
thesis with the commitments of previous regimes.103  By contrast, my model 
assumes that constitutional constructions come in many different sizes, 
from very great to very small.  Moreover, constitutional constructions have 
no set time limit.  Some very important shifts have emerged from modest 
changes that culminate over time. 
Second, Ackerman argues that regime changes are democratically le-
gitimate because they enjoy the self-conscious, mobilized, and broad sup-
port of the American people.104  This means that the American people, or at 
least, the vast majority of them, must understand that the Constitution is be-
ing amended and previous constitutional commitments are being discarded, 
and they must actively support these changes.  By contrast, I argue that the 
American people do not need to have—and generally do not have—a self-
conscious understanding of new constitutional constructions as revolution-
ary constitutional amendments.  Many constitutional constructions go 
largely unnoticed by the public.  Moreover, when members of the public ac-
tively support them (which they may not) they tend to understand these 
changes as restorations or redemptions of constitutional text and principle 
rather than as displacements or amendments.105  Even during the height of 
the controversy over the New Deal, Franklin Roosevelt insisted that his 
proposals for reform were fully consistent with the constitutional text; he 
wanted the right to appoint new Justices who would read the Constitution 
correctly.106  In any case, much constitutional construction, especially 
smaller and mid-level changes, occurs without self-conscious mobilization 
or assent by the American people.  Rather, it reflects the passage of new 
legislation and administrative regulations by the national political coalition, 
and the Judiciary’s adjustment, rationalization, and extension of these ef-
forts. 
Third, Ackerman’s constitutional moments usually have some tincture 




103  1 ACKERMAN, supra note 35, at 131–62 (1991) (describing intergenerational synthesis and offer-
ing Brown v. Board of Education and Griswold v. Connecticut as examples). 
104  Ackerman, supra note 102, at 2283–85 (emphasizing self-consciousness of actors in moments of 
revolutionary change); see, e.g., 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 35, at 358–59 (arguing that ordinary Ameri-
cans understood the events of the New Deal as a constitutional revolution, confirmed by the consolidat-
ing election of 1940); 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 35, at 290 (revolutionary agendas must seek “to gain the 
deep, broad and decisive support of the American people”). 
105  See Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, supra note 3, at 301, 309; Balkin, Constitutional 
Redemption, supra note 3, at 506–08.  
106  Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address on Constitution Day, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 17, 1937), avail-
able at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15459 (“You will find no justification in any of the 
language of the Constitution, for delay in the reforms which the mass of the American people now de-
mand. . . .  [N]early every attempt to meet those demands for social and economic betterment has been 
jeopardized or actually forbidden by those who have sought to read into the Constitution language which 
the framers refused to write into the Constitution.”). 
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conventional adaptations” of existing constitutional machinery that the peo-
ple accept or reject.107  By contrast, constitutional constructions in my 
model present themselves as perfectly legal articulations of text and princi-
ple; at most they discard previous constructions that advocates claim are no 
longer faithful to the best understandings of text and principle and have 
otherwise lost connection with changed social and political realities. 
Fourth, in order to ensure that regime change enjoys the mobilized 
support of the American public, Ackerman requires that change must trav-
erse a five-stage process: a signaling event, a proposal, a triggering election, 
a ratifying election, and consolidation.108  If change does not correspond to 
this sequence of events, it is not legitimate.  By contrast, I argue that consti-
tutional constructions emerge through many different methods, and there is 
no necessary sequence they must follow to create valid law. 
Fifth, Ackerman’s model has a place for what I call constitutional con-
struction but he explains its democratic legitimacy differently.  The com-
mitments of a new regime, he argues, must be worked out over time and 
synthesized with the commitments of previous regimes.  For example, he 
assumes that the sex equality jurisprudence of the 1970s is not part of the 
civil rights revolution, which Ackerman believes was centrally about racial 
equality.109  Instead, this jurisprudence is a judicial elaboration of the 1960s’ 
civil rights regime synthesized with the commitments of previous regimes 




107  2 ACKERMAN, supra note 35, at 9, 22, 82, 120, 154 (discussing the role of unconventional adap-
tations in higher lawmaking.); id. at 187 (unconventional adaptation by political elites allows them to 
test the assent of the public).  Ackerman’s idea of unconventional adaptation better fits constitutional 
controversies during the Founding, the Jeffersonian revolution, and Reconstruction; in the case of the 
New Deal, he argues that lawyers’ use of Supreme Court opinions as amendment analogues is an un-
conventional adaptation, id. at 270–71, although it does not fit into his five-part scheme in the same way 
as in the previous historical examples.  These opinions appear at the last stage of consolidation rather 
than setting up the key moment of popular decision for or against revolutionary change.  See id. at 187–
88.  Although Ackerman does not address the point directly, presumably the use of both landmark judi-
cial decisions and landmark statutes as amendment equivalents is the characteristic unconventional ad-
aptation of the civil rights revolution.  See Ackerman, supra note 31, at 1760–61, 1770–71 (arguing that 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, like the Fourteenth Amendment during Reconstruction, placed the question of 
revolutionary change before the public). 
108   2 ACKERMAN, supra note 35, at 20, 26, 359 (discussing the procedural preconditions for legiti-
mate change); id. at 166, 207, 211 (noting the signaling act of illegality by the Convention/Congress, 
resistance by conservative branches, recourse to the people through a triggering election, the unconven-
tional threat of Presidential impeachment, and eventual capitulation in the Reconstruction period); id. at 
359 (noting the structure of New Deal revolution involving a triggering election, the unconventional 
threat by President Roosevelt, transformative appointments, a ratifying, consolidating election, and con-
solidating judicial opinions); Ackerman, supra note 31, at 1762 (describing the five-stage process for 
civil rights revolution); Ackerman, supra note 102, at 2298–99 (noting the pattern of signaling, propos-
ing, triggering, and ratifying by the Federalists). 
109  Ackerman, supra note 31, at 1741, 1790. 
110  Bruce Ackerman, Interpreting the Women’s Movement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1421, 1426 (2006) (“It 
was the Court’s understanding of the evolving requirements of Equal Protection which shaped its re-
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tions derives from the democratic legitimacy of each of the regimes whose 
commitments judges synthesize. The legitimacy of these decisions does not 
come from their contemporaneous connection to national public opinion 
about sex equality or to the values of the dominant national political coali-
tion.  By contrast, I argue that the judicial recognition of sex equality in the 
1970s emerged from significant changes in popular opinion spurred on by 
the second wave of American feminism, from the efforts of state legisla-
tures and the political branches of the federal government—who began to 
put sex equality guarantees into legislation and administrative regulations—
and from Congress’s submission of the Equal Rights Amendment to the 
states in 1972.111  The federal courts’ sex equality decisions in the 1970s 
recognized and rationalized these shifts in constitutional culture; the deci-
sions gained their legitimacy from their connection to changes in constitu-
tional culture and contemporaneous constitutional constructions by the 
political branches. 
Sixth, Ackerman’s model argues that the central artifacts of regime 
changes, especially in the twentieth century, are landmark decisions and 
landmark statutes.  One of his most controversial claims is that these deci-
sion and statutes are full-fledged constitutional amendments.112  They have 
the same legal status as other constitutional amendments passed through 
Article V.  Moreover, Ackerman argues that courts should reason from their 
text and principles in the same way that they reason from newly enacted 
constitutional texts.113  By contrast, I do not regard either the Social Security 
Act of 1935 or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as constitutional 
amendments.  They are ordinary legislation which can be amended (and 
have been amended) or even repealed through the ordinary political proc-
ess.  If Congress does not repeal the Social Security Act or Title VII, it is 
not because it lacks the formal authority to do so.  It is rather because these 
constructions are durable in practice and it would be politically difficult if 
not impossible to repeal them in our current political culture.114  Even so, 
landmark statutes like the National Labor Relations Act, the Voting Rights 
                                                                                                                 
sponse to the women’s movement, not the other way around.”); id. at 1434 (arguing that the Court 
worked out implications of commitment of racial equality to gender stereotyping). 
111  See supra text accompanying note 78. 
112  2 ACKERMAN, supra note 104, at 270 (describing Darby and Wickard as “amendment ana-
logues”); Ackerman, supra note 31, at 1761 (“I will be presenting the landmark statutes of the 1960s as 
functionally equivalent to the constitutional amendments of the 1860s.”); id. at 1788 (“The legal land-
marks emerging from this moment of popular sovereignty should not be denigrated merely because they 
took the form of statutes rather than formal amendments.”). 
113  Ackerman, supra note 31, at 1753–54 & n.38. 
114  Ackerman does not disagree.  See id. at 1788–89.  However, he characterizes the issue differ-
ently: he argues that “an all-out assault on the Civil Rights Act, or the Voting Rights Act, could not oc-
cur without a massive effort comparable to the political exertions that created these landmarks in the 
first place.”  Id. at 1788.  Since these landmark statutes are constitutional amendments outside of Article 
V, it would seem to follow from his reasoning that the same five-stage process would be required legiti-
mately to repeal these statutes.  This is not my view. 
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Act, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 have been repeatedly altered through 
ordinary legislation throughout their history, and these legislative amend-
ments are not unconstitutional, even if they are unwise or inconsistent with 
the spirit of the original enactments. 
In like fashion, key doctrines created by courts are not amendments to 
the Constitution, as Ackerman contends, but constitutional constructions 
that can be limited, distinguished, or even overturned by later courts in the 
same way that any other decisions can be limited, distinguished, or over-
turned.  Landmark decisions like United States v. Darby and Wickard v. 
Filburn could, in theory, be significantly limited or jettisoned tomorrow if 
courts found them unworkable or completely inhospitable to the needs of 
the national political coalition, but this is unlikely to happen because so 
much depends on their continuation.115  This is in part what it means to say 
that they are durable and canonical constructions.116  Perhaps the most fa-
mous of all landmark decisions, Brown v. Board of Education, has been 
continuously reinterpreted since it was first handed down, and there is a 
strong argument that it has been significantly modified, if not wholly trans-
formed, by later decisions.117  This has happened, in part, because courts 
have reinterpreted and reshaped Brown in concert with the shifting values 
and agendas of successful countermobilizations and the dominant national 
political coalition. 
E. Why Courts Cooperate in Constitutional Construction 
Institutional factors explain why courts behave in the way I have de-
scribed.  The Supreme Court is a multimember body whose decisions in 
close cases tend to be resolved by the median or swing Justices, whose 
identity (and position at the median), in turn, is produced by successive ju-
dicial appointments.  In addition, Justices are legal professionals, and pro-




115  Balkin & Levinson, Constitutional Change, supra note 53, at 510–13 (2006) (explaining why 
the Rehnquist Court’s federalism revolution did not fundamentally reshape New Deal precedents). 
116  See infra Part II.F. 
117  See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification 
or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 28–32 (2003) (explaining how political countermobiliza-
tions reshaped antidiscrimination law); Balkin, supra note 36, at 1563–68 (explaining how changes in 
American politics altered Brown’s practical meaning); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination 
and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1547 
(2004) [hereinafter Siegel, Equality Talk] (showing how the “anticlassification principle was not the 
[original] ground of the Brown decision, but instead emerged from struggles over the decision’s en-
forcement”); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 
(1989) (arguing that 1970s equal protection jurisprudence limited the transformative potential of 
Brown). 
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cultural mainstream.  Lower courts are also staffed by legal professionals 
and are further hemmed in by the Supreme Court’s precedents.118 
The distribution of public opinion and professional notions of reason-
ableness, however, do not remain constant.  Social movements, interest 
groups, and political parties vie with each other to influence popular beliefs 
about the Constitution.  Social and political movements seek to alter what is 
“off-the-wall” and “on-the-wall” in constitutional culture and eventually in 
professional legal thought.119  The appointments process also reflects a tug 
of war between different social and political constituencies.  Partisan en-
trenchment in the Judiciary120 combined with changing popular attitudes and 
shifts in constitutional culture eventually become reflected in judicial deci-
sionmaking using vague texts.  Thus, as I describe in more detail later on, 
the processes of living constitutionalism gradually translate constitutional 
politics into constitutional law. 
These political and cultural influences can push doctrine to the left as 
well as to the right.  Some of the most powerful social movements and po-
litical forces in the past forty years have been conservative, and therefore it 
is no surprise that many constitutional doctrines reflect contemporary con-
servative ideas.  Political conservatives have influenced political culture for 
the past generation, and have enjoyed sufficient political clout to staff most 
of the federal Judiciary and a majority of the positions on the Supreme 
Court.  The same basic features of constitutional politics that led courts to 
recognize the rights of gays in Lawrence v. Texas also produced recognition 
of an individual right to bear arms in District of Columbia v. Heller.121  In-
deed, the very same weather vane, the swing Justice, Anthony Kennedy, 
was the fifth and deciding vote in both decisions. 
In short, the Judiciary cooperates with the political branches because of 
institutional features of democratic politics.  Living constitutionalism is a 
process of argument and persuasion in politics and culture that is eventually 




118  For discussions of institutional constraints on judges, see Balkin, Abortion and Original Mean-
ing, supra note 3, at 310–11; Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 3, at 513–16; Barry Fried-
man, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 270–329 (2005). 
119  On the concept of a “constitutional culture,” see Robert C. Post, Fashioning the Legal Constitu-
tion: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8–11, 53–56 (2003).  On the idea of “off-the-
wall” and “on-the-wall” constitutional interpretations, and their importance to constitutional theory, see 
Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. L. 
REV. 677, 713, 718–24 (2005) [hereinafter Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”]; Jack M. Balkin, 
How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the Constitution: The Case of the New Departure, 
39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27, 28 (2005); Jack M. Balkin, Respect-Worthy: Frank Michelman and the Le-
gitimate Constitution, 39 TULSA L. REV. 485, 507–10 (2004) [hereinafter Balkin, Respect-Worthy]; Jack 
M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1444–47 
(2001). 
120  See sources cited supra note 53. 
121  128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).   
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should be working harder to get the national politics you like, because that 
is the engine of constitutional construction.  
The system of living constitutionalism does not depend on judges of 
impeccable character any more than it depends on the good character of leg-
islators and Presidents.  Indeed, as critics of the federal Judiciary often re-
mind us, the members of the federal Judiciary may not be wiser or more 
moral than the political process itself.  Even so, the Framers of our Consti-
tution recognized that multiple institutions that compete with and check 
each other can add to the legitimacy of the political system.  Different insti-
tutional roles foster different role moralities and perspectives.  The clash of 
these positions restrains all of the participants in the constitutional system.  
We can best understand the Judiciary not as a special font of wisdom or po-
litical morality but as an institution of constitutional development with a 
distinctive institutional role and professional ethos that competes and coop-
erates with constitutional development by the other branches.  The Judiciary 
generally cooperates with policies that demonstrate sustained popular sup-
port at the national level, but also usually acts as a check on radical consti-
tutional innovation that lacks sustained support.  These judicial functions 
serve the larger goals of constitutionalism and thus contribute to the democ-
ratic legitimacy of the political system as a whole, even if particular mem-
bers of the Judiciary do not possess judgment superior to most members of 
the national political process. 
F. Durability, Canonicity, and the Emergence 
of New Secondary Rules 
Under this model of constitutional construction, many things cannot be 
changed without constitutional amendment.  For example, the “hard-wired” 
features of the Constitution are fixed; so too are those rules that follow di-
rectly from the original meaning of the text.  This is the point of framework 
originalism. 
In addition, constitutional constructions—both those created by the po-
litical branches and those created by courts—can also become durable and 
canonical.  Durability means that constitutional constructions—whether in 
the form of statues, practices, or decisions—are not easy to change, how-
ever easy this might appear as a formal matter.  Canonicity means that con-
stitutional constructions are important to legal understanding—and 
especially professional legal understanding—in the current constitutional 
culture.122  Canonical constructions set the parameters for what is consid-
ered reasonable and central, or unreasonable and peripheral in the constitu-




122  Sanford Levinson and I have distinguished the constitutional canon as understood by citizens 
from the canon as understood by legal professionals.  See J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons 
of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1998).  However, these inevitably overlap and influence 
each other. 
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constitutional development.  Legal thought is distinctive in that it has both a 
canon of constructions that are currently valued in constitutional culture and 
an anti-canon of prior, rejected constructions that legal professionals now 
regard as characteristic examples of how not to reason about the Constitu-
tion.123  Dred Scott v. Sandford is a well-known example of an anti-
canonical decision.  
Constructions become durable in part because they are useful to every-
day political life and because successive generations build on them and de-
pend on their continuation.  Constitutional constructions become durable 
because they are embedded in political, economic, and social practices and 
people continuously build on those practices.  Dependence in use not only 
makes these constructions durable; it also causes people to view them as 
correct or even obvious interpretations of the Constitution. 
Constitutional constructions become canonical because their meaning 
is salient and important to our political regime.  Canonical constructions 
pose agendas and problems to solve; they symbolize important commit-
ments and values; and therefore people feel the need to rationalize and syn-
thesize their positions with these constructions.  Conversely, people feel the 
need to show why their positions are inconsistent with or repudiate con-
structions that are anti-canonical in the current regime.  Some constitutional 
constructions can be more canonical—in the sense of being salient and im-
portant to current understandings and debates—than parts of the constitu-
tional text.  The Social Security Act,124 Brown v. Board of Education, and 
even Roe v. Wade are more canonical in the present constitutional regime 
than the Import-Export Clause of Article I.125 
Many constitutional constructions are both durable and canonical, and 
these characteristics often reinforce each other.  Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion is both durable and canonical.  So too are the Civil Rights Act of 
1964126 and the Social Security Act.  They are durable in the sense that peo-
ple rely on them and build on them.  They are canonical in the sense that 
people see them as articulating important values and commitments. 
Constitutional constructions can be durable but not canonical.  Many 
statutes that promote constitutional values are not central to the meaning of 
the existing constitutional regime, and so too are many precedents embed-
ded in the fabric of the law that nobody pays much attention to.  Construc-
tions can be durable but not canonical if they lack cultural meaning or 





123  Id. at 1018–19. 
124  Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C. (2006)). 
125  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5. 
126  Pub. L. No. 82-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 and 42 
U.S.C.). 
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Conversely, constitutional constructions can be canonical but not dura-
ble, if, for example, they are canonical because they are controversial, like 
Brown before 1964 or Roe v. Wade today, or if they become part of the anti-
canon, like Lochner v. New York127 or Dred Scott.  (Although Dred Scott has 
a prominent place in the anti-canon, it is not currently important to every-
day political practice.) 
Durability does not mean resistance to all alteration.  Landmark stat-
utes are often amended, and courts and administrative agencies put many 
glosses on them.  Rather, durability means that people build on a construc-
tion, and by building on it, depend on its continuation.  Precisely because 
the construction serves as a building block for future improvements, it may 
be altered in the process so that it better meshes with the interests, values, 
and understandings of the existing constitutional regime. 
Likewise, canonicity does not require that social meaning remains con-
stant.  Quite the contrary: canonical constructions are often protean—they 
seem to mean new things as they are introduced into new political and legal 
contexts.  For example, the meaning of cases like Brown, Marbury, Roe, or 
Lochner may change greatly over time as a result of political contestation or 
in the context of successive regimes.128  
Moreover, a principle associated with a constitutional construction can 
be durable or canonical, but how the principle would apply to specific ap-
plications or facts can change.  For example, the principle of West Coast 
Hotel v. Parrish in 1937—deference to legislative judgments in social and 
economic legislation—is durable.  Yet the actual statute upheld in West 
Coast Hotel—a minimum wage law for women but not for men—would no 
longer be considered ordinary social and economic legislation.  It would 
violate the Equal Protection Clause under the Supreme Court’s 1970s sex 
equality jurisprudence.129 
Conversely, certain basic applications of a canonical construction like 
Brown to its original facts might remain constant—de jure racial segrega-
tion is still illegal—but the construction’s meaning and the principles it 
stands for can change as people fight over its legacy and invoke it for dif-
ferent purposes.  Later generations can also blunt its practical effects in 
some areas—such as school integration—while expanding it in others, such 




127  198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
128  See Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided,” supra note 119 (noting the changing meanings of 
Lochner in constitutional canon). 
129  E.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (requiring intermediate scrutiny of all sex classifica-
tions); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion) (sex classifications are inher-
ently invidious and subject to strict judicial scrutiny); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (statute 
preferring male over female executors of estates was an arbitrary choice forbidden by the Equal Protec-
tion Clause). 
130  See Balkin & Siegel, supra note 117, at 28–32 (2003) (describing the end of the Second Recon-
struction and how political struggles changed the practical meaning of the antidiscrimination principle); 
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How and why do constitutional constructions become durable or ca-
nonical?  There are four basic reasons: 
(1) Constitutional constructions become durable when people stop 
fighting about them and accept them in practice.131 
(2) Constitutional constructions become durable when they become 
embedded in practice and people build on them.  The New Deal 
cases—United States v. Darby,132 Wickard v. Fillburn,133 and Steward 
Machine Company v. Davis134—are durable in this way. 
(3) Constitutional constructions become canonical when people stop 
fighting over whether to accept them and start fighting over their mean-
ing and legacy.  This is what happened to Brown and the 1970s sex 
equality decisions. 
(4) Constitutional constructions become canonical when fights over 
their meaning become important to resolving constitutional disputes in 
the present.  They set the agenda of constitutional reasoning and debate.  
This is true of Roe v. Wade today.  It will likely also be true of Law-
rence v. Texas, which recognized gay rights, and District of Columbia 
v. Heller, which recognized an individual right to bear arms in the 
home for purposes of self-defense. 
Both durability and canonicity are features of constitutional culture: 
they concern which practices and understandings become normal, expected, 
essential, compulsory, or simply go without saying; which issues are salient 
and which fade into the background of concern.  Durable and canonical 
constructions help shape what kinds of claims are “off-the-wall” and “on-
the-wall” at a given time and what legal professionals regard as reasonable 
and unreasonable positions.  One can characterize a constitutional culture 
like our own in terms of what is durable and what is canonical at a particu-
lar time in history. 
                                                                                                                 
Balkin, supra note 36, at 1563–68; Siegel, Equality Talk, supra note 117, at 1547 (showing how the “an-
ticlassification principle was not the [original] ground of the Brown decision, but instead emerged from 
struggles over the decision’s enforcement”). 
131  See Mark A. Graber, Settling the West: The Annexation of Texas, the Louisiana Purchase and 
Bush v. Gore, in THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE AND AMERICAN EXPANSIONISM 83, 85 (Sanford Levinson 
& Bartholomew Sparrow eds., 2006) (noting that serious constitutional questions regarding the Louisi-
ana Purchase and the annexation of Texas were settled not by courts, but when opponents of these 
measures conceded defeat in the political arena). 
132  312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
133  317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
134  301 U.S. 548 (1937) (upholding the unemployment compensation provisions of the Social Secu-
rity Act of 1935). 
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Durable and canonical constructions can be limited, overthrown, re-
pealed, or made irrelevant.  But this takes sustained effort over periods of 
time.  This is the connection between durability, canonicity, and the proc-
esses of constitutional change I identify with living constitutionalism.  The 
process of living constitutionalism not only features durable and canonical 
constructions in particular eras, but the gradual replacement or supplemen-
tation of some constructions with new ones over time.  Thus, one way of 
understanding living constitutionalism is the process by which some dura-
ble and canonical constructions become embedded, extended, and supple-
mented in constitutional culture, while others are slowly limited, expunged, 
or made practically irrelevant. 
Griswold v. Connecticut135 and Eisenstadt v. Baird136  are durable and 
canonical constructions, in part because of the success of the sexual revolu-
tion.  Likewise, the Voting Rights Act137 is durable and canonical: even 
though parts of it must be renewed by Congress, it is currently unthinkable 
that Congress would not renew it.  Because of changes in social attitudes 
about homosexuality, and new social practices around which people have 
organized their lives, Lawrence is clearly canonical, as mentioned above, 
and is probably already durable.  Like Griswold and Eisenstadt, Lawrence 
is an example of how living constitutionalism and the concepts of durability 
and canonicity are always in dialogue with social norms and mores.  People 
are not actively trying to overturn Lawrence; no major political figure in 
2009 seeks to reinstate the sort of criminal penalties for homosexual con-
duct that politicians might have supported in the past.  Instead, the debate 
over gay rights has moved on to issues of same-sex marriage and employ-
ment discrimination.  
Durable and canonical constitutional constructions like Griswold or the 
Voting Rights Act become part of the “constitutional catechism” that all 
Supreme Court Justices who seek confirmation must accept as valid.138  The 
constitutional catechism is important because it suggests that there are a se-
ries of decisions, institutions, and statutes that have been so accepted by the 
public and by political elites that no judicial nominee can be confirmed if he 
or she would threaten their continuation.  Judge Robert Bork failed confir-
mation in 1987 in part because people could not be sure that he accepted the 




135  381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
136  405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
137  Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973 (2006)). 
138  See Jack M. Balkin, The Constitutional Catechism, Balkinization, Jan. 11, 2006, 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/01/constitutional-catechism.html. 
139  See DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING 
OF ROE V. WADE 671 (1994); Lackland H. Bloom, Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Griswold v. Connecticut 
and the Right to Privacy: The Legacy of Griswold, 16 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 511, 542–43 (1989); David J. 
Garrow, Abortion Before and After Roe v. Wade: An Historical Perspective, 62 ALB. L. REV. 833, 843 
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cial appointments, a key element of the process of living constitutionalism; 
their effects on judicial appointments, in turn, reinforce their canonical and 
durable character. 
Canonical constructions that are not durable can affect judicial ap-
pointments in a different way: social movements press to reshape them or 
even overturn them.  Roe v. Wade is clearly canonical, because it creates 
problems that people feel they must discuss and resolve.  But it is not yet 
durable because people have not given up fighting about whether to over-
rule it.  Every Supreme Court appointment since the 1980s has occurred in 
the shadow of the struggle over this most canonical of contemporary con-
structions. 
Living constitutionalism is a system of constitutional development that 
produces new constitutional constructions.  This system of constitutional 
development did not emerge all at once; rather, it evolved through the inter-
action of the basic framework created by the Constitution and its amend-
ments with constitutional constructions that were added at various points in 
time.  The system of living constitutionalism not only produces new doc-
trines and institutions; it also creates its own set of secondary rules—that is, 
ways for building new constitutional constructions.  Bruce Ackerman has 
pointed out, for example, that our methods of constitutional development 
have become increasingly nationalist over time.140  Constitutional amend-
ment under Article V requires the concurrence of three quarters of state leg-
islatures, almost all of which are bicameral, thus creating many different 
ways to defeat amendments.  In the twentieth century, America has increas-
ingly shifted toward nationalist forms of constitutional construction as the 
central method of constitutional development: judicial decisions by federal 
courts, federal framework statutes, and the creation of new federal institu-
tions. 
These emerging forms of constitutional construction developed to-
gether in response to each other.  For example, the development of federal 
judicial doctrine greatly accelerated after the Civil War—and especially 
during the twentieth century—because of five key features.  The first was 
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, which required that state and 
local governments adhere to basic rights guarantees.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment made it easier for the federal courts to supervise local and re-
gional majorities and keep them in line with the values of the national po-
litical coalition.  During the late nineteenth century, the federal courts 
promoted economic nationalism; during the middle of the twentieth cen-
tury, they promoted federal civil rights.  A second and related phenomenon 
was the Republican Party’s decision to greatly expand the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts after the Civil War.  This increased the number of times that 
                                                                                                                 
(1999); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: 
The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1409 (2006). 
140  2 ACKERMAN, supra note 35, at 16–23; Ackerman, supra note 31, at 1754, 1761, 1775. 
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federal courts would pass on constitutional issues and thus, in the long run, 
increased the chances for doctrinal development, elaboration, and prolifera-
tion.141   
A third feature was the development during the twentieth century of  
new institutions of civil society that promoted constitutional litigation as a 
method of social change and appointment of judges as a key goal of elec-
toral politics.  These civil society institutions, as Steven Teles has de-
scribed, created new forms of ideological and partisan competition outside 
the electoral system that helped change constitutional culture and profes-
sional reasoning.142 
A fourth key element was the rise of the administrative and welfare 
state during the twentieth century.  This greatly increased the amount of 
legislation as well as the number of administrative regulations.  Statutes and 
administrative decisions are the building blocks of new constitutional con-
structions by the political branches.  Rising amounts of legislation and regu-
lation, in turn, increased the number of possible occasions for litigants to 
raise constitutional and administrative challenges and the number of oppor-
tunities for federal courts to develop and proliferate doctrine. 
Finally, the rise of an administrative and welfare state also meant that 
Congress and the President increasingly created new agencies, institutions, 
and practices that changed the structures of government on the ground.  
New landmark and framework statutes created an elaborate legal and insti-
tutional infrastructure that shaped the Constitution-in-practice.  Following 
their customary role, courts were called on to rationalize, legitimate, and 
regulate this burgeoning regime, leading not only to increased work for 
themselves but also increasing their responsibility and their power.  The 
New Deal, for example, created a large federal bureaucracy, new social 
programs, and new institutional structures.  Courts justified and legitimated 
these changes in governance, but in the process began to subject them to 
procedural and constitutional norms, thus proliferating judicial precedents 
and constitutional constructions. 
Continuous interaction, cooperation, and contest between the Judiciary 
and the political branches have created ever new opportunities for new con-
stitutional constructions outside the amendment process.  Thus, although 
the twentieth century has featured no less than twelve Article V amend-
ments, focusing only on these amendments does not offer an accurate por-
trait of the key changes in American constitutionalism of the past hundred 




141  See Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: 
Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511, 515–17 (2002) (showing 
how late nineteenth-century Republicans expanded federal court jurisdiction to promote their policy 
goals and entrench their party); cf. RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY 39 (2004) (noting how poli-
ticians in many different countries profit “from an expansion of judicial power”). 
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administrative and welfare state, the expansion of presidential power, the 
creation of a National Security State, or the civil rights revolution.143  Con-
stitutional construction has become the dominant form of constitutional de-
velopment today, because previous constructions during the twentieth 
century have made available so many new methods of constitutional change 
that can be more efficient, narrowly tailored, and agile than Article V 
amendment. 
III. LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY 
Let me summarize the argument so far: Constitutional development 
outside the amendment process is the work of constitutional construction.  
Constitutional construction involves both the political branches and the 
courts.  Constitutional construction by courts, in turn, is largely responsive 
to larger changes in political culture, public opinion, and the work of the 
political branches.  What we call “living” constitutionalism is really the 
product of constitutional construction and changes in constitutional con-
struction over time.  For this reason it is what Robert Post and Reva Siegel 
call a “democratic constitutionalism”144 because constitutional doctrine is 
responsive to the social and political mobilizations and counter-
mobilizations that promote popular ideas of the Constitution’s values, and 
to the views of popularly elected national political elites.  Change occurs (1) 
because of changes in constitutional culture—what ordinary citizens and le-
gal and political elites believe the Constitution means and who they believe 
has authority to make claims on the Constitution; (2) because of changes in 
political institutions and statecraft, which courts normally make sense of 
and legitimate; and (3) because of changes in judicial personnel (and hence 
their views of the Constitution).  The latter changes are due to the judicial 
appointments process, which is controlled by elected officials—particularly 
the President and the Senate—who in turn respond to existing political 
pressures and incentives. 
One might make two objections to this account of living constitutional-
ism.  The first is that it is insufficiently legal—that it gives too much power 
to cultural and political influences, the national political process, political 
mobilization, and partisan entrenchment, rather than reasoned development 
of doctrine by courts.  The second is that the account is insufficiently politi-
cal.  If the Supreme Court responds to changes in public opinion and politi-




143  See Bruce Ackerman, Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecture: The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. 
REV. 1737, 1738–44 (2007) (“We have lost our ability to write down our new constitutional commit-
ments in the old-fashioned way.”). 
144  Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 
42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 374–76 (2007); see also FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra 
note 38 (arguing that the history of the Supreme Court demonstrates democratic constitutionalism). 
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judicial review entirely?  I respond to the first objection in Part III.A and to 
the second objection in Part III.B. 
A. Courts Are Bad at Tackling, Good at Piling On145 
One might argue that courts should be, in Ronald Dworkin’s words, 
“the forum of principle.”146  They should take the lead on questions of 
rights, justice, and constitutional structure, rather than letting constitutional 
development be guided or pushed by political and social movements.  But 
this is a false dichotomy.  The locus of constitutional change occurs simul-
taneously in the courts, in the political branches, and in the public sphere.  
History teaches us that courts normally do not engage in significant changes 
in constitutional doctrine without lengthy prodding from a sustained cam-
paign by social movements and political parties.147  Such campaigns gener-
ally employ not only litigation but also political mobilization and cultural 
and social persuasion.  The long march of progressivism that led to the New 
Deal revolution and the even longer march that led to the civil rights revolu-
tion are two obvious examples, but the same could be said of almost every 
important transformation in constitutional doctrine in the country’s history.  
If one admires these achievements of living constitutionalism, one must pay 
proper respects to the social and political mobilizations that preceded them. 
Brown v. Board of Education did not arise full-blown from the head of 
Earl Warren; it was the result of a several decades-long campaign, well 
documented by historians, in which the Supreme Court made only sporadic 
and not always helpful appearances.148  World War II and the Truman Ad-
ministration were crucial events, and, as previously noted, President Tru-
man asked the Court to overrule Plessy v. Ferguson149 four years before it 
actually got around to doing so.150  State courts and state legislatures, espe-
cially in the North, were also particularly important in the lengthy process 
of changing constitutional culture leading up to Brown.151  Constitutional 
innovations in state and local law usually precede the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
entree into a new area. 
One might worry that social movements and political parties will shape 
constitutional culture poorly without the careful and regular guidance of 
wiser courts.  But whether one likes it or not, courts generally do not pay 
much attention to constitutional claims until social and political mobiliza-




145  Balkin, supra note 36, at 1546. 
146  Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469 (1981). 
147  For general discussions of this point, see Balkin, supra note 36; KLARMAN, supra note 40. 
148  The story is told in KLARMAN, supra note 40. 
149  163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
150  See Klarman, supra note 85. 
151  See, e.g., Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948) (holding that an antimiscegenation law vio-
lated the federal Equal Protection Clause). 
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today’s constitutional doctrines.  The work of social movements and politi-
cal parties in making claims, taking positions, and trying to persuade others 
that their views are correct is crucial to constitutional development.  That is 
because courts generally will not engage in constitutional innovation until 
political success changes the composition of the Judiciary or alters the po-
litical and constitutional culture in which courts make their decisions. 
Courts usually do not get involved in developing new constitutional 
doctrines—whether about gun rights or gay rights—until political forces are 
strong enough to make them sit up and take notice.  The great irony of the 
Carolene Products152 doctrine that the courts will look out for the interests 
of “discrete and insular minorities” is that no group gets recognized as “dis-
crete and insular,” and therefore deserving of judicial protection, until it has 
gained the attention of political majorities.153  Until it gains some political 
clout, a minority group is usually simply ignored.  Blacks got increasing at-
tention from the courts after black migration to the North and to urban areas 
made them swing voters who could influence elections,154 and after Jim 
Crow became an embarrassment to the American foreign policy establish-
ment during the Cold War.155  Blacks made progress in the courts, in other 
words, because they made political progress through a halting and agoniz-
ingly slow process.  (Of course, the one place blacks made little or no pro-
gress was in the South, and the civil rights revolution essentially imposed a 
national majority’s views about race on the country, displacing those of a 
regional majority in the South.) 
The Court’s sex discrimination decisions of the 1970s followed an 
enormous groundswell of support for sex equality in popular culture and 
social movement mobilization (not to mention passage of the ERA by 
overwhelming margins in both houses of Congress in 1972).156  From 1921 
in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital157 until the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court 
pretty much stayed out of the gender equality business (there are two cases, 
Goesaert v. Cleary158 in 1948 and Hoyt v. Florida159 in 1961, both treating 
sex equality claims dismissively). 
Finally, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in District of Columbia v. 
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153  See Balkin, supra note 36, at 1551–58; KLARMAN, supra note 40, at 450. 
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example of the processes of living constitutionalism in operation.  Doctrinal 
recognition of an individual right to own guns for self-defense arose only 
after both political culture and political elites supported the right.  For many 
years the conventional wisdom following the passage of the 1934 National 
Firearms Act160 during the New Deal was that the Second Amendment did 
not guarantee an individual right to use guns for self-defense.  In 1991, for 
example, retired Chief Justice Warren Burger, a conservative establishment 
Republican, insisted that the individual rights view of the Second Amend-
ment was “one of the greatest pieces of fraud—I repeat the word ‘fraud’—
on the American public by special interest groups that I have ever seen in 
my lifetime.”161  Burger cast particular scorn on the efforts of the National 
Rifle Association (NRA) and other groups—which he pejoratively labeled 
“special interest groups”—to convince Americans otherwise.162  
The modern movement for gun rights arose in reaction to increased po-
litical mobilization for stricter gun control laws, particularly after passage 
of the 1968 Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,163 which Congress enacted 
following the assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert F. Ken-
nedy.164  Beginning in the 1970s, the NRA, which had previously acqui-
esced in some gun control legislation and formed alliances with hunters and 
conservation groups, changed its leadership.  It began aggressive national 
lobbying efforts to oppose gun control legislation.  It negotiated the tension 
between gun rights and conservative demands for “law and order” by dis-
tinguishing between law-abiding citizens who had rights to guns for self-
defense and criminals who had no rights.165 
The NRA’s new position on gun rights quickly gained influence within 
the Republican Party, as New Right leaders like Richard Viguerie recog-
nized that gun rights could play a key role in the emerging culture wars 
over abortion, women’s rights, homosexuality, affirmative action, and por-
nography.166  Movement conservatives who had previously used originalism 
to attack liberal judicial decisions, now turned to originalism to defend Sec-
ond Amendment rights.167  As conservatives gained increasing political in-
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constitutional position gained increasing public support, and convinced 
members of a newer generation of conservative legal elites.  In 1994, the 
Republicans took control of both Houses of Congress by making their op-
position to recent gun control laws passed by a Democratic-controlled Con-
gress a key campaign issue.168 
In her study of the contemporary constitutional movement for gun 
rights, Reva Siegel has pointed out that during the 1980s the NRA empha-
sized a republican or insurrectionist theory of the Second Amendment—that 
protected the right of citizens to resist a tyrannical government—and had 
flirted with the radical militia movement.169  Following the Oklahoma City 
terrorist bombings in 1995, however, the militia movement came under 
strong public criticism.170  The NRA quickly distanced itself from the militia 
movement; it promoted gun rights as an element of the culture wars and in-
creasingly emphasized that law-abiding citizens had the right to have weap-
ons for self-defense in the home to protect themselves against criminals.171  
This also became the view of the conservative movement in the Republican 
Party.  In May 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft announced the Bush 
Justice Department’s official position that the Second Amendment pro-
tected an individual right to use arms in self-defense.172 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Heller largely followed the emerg-
ing public vision of gun rights, the NRA’s shift away from the insurrection-
ist theory, and the NRA’s emphasis on the distinction between law-abiding 
citizens and criminals.173  Thus, his opinion effectively elevated the self-
defense theory over the insurrectionist theory of the Second Amendment, 
although the latter theory has far more historical support in the period lead-




168  See Nicholas J. Johnson, A Second Amendment Moment: The Constitutional Politics of Gun 
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HARV. L. REV. 145 (2008) (noting evidence for republican or citizen-militia theory at Founding and only 
indirect evidence for incorporation of common law right of self-defense). 
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defense becomes stronger during the nineteenth century.175  In fact, perhaps 
the strongest originalist argument comes not from the original understand-
ing of the Second Amendment but from its subsequent incorporation in the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.176 
Scalia’s majority opinion in Heller emphasized the right of law-abiding 
citizens to keep guns in their home and strongly suggested that felons will 
have no Second Amendment rights.177  In fact, near the end of his opinion 
he acknowledged that modern developments in weaponry may have made 
the Second Amendment’s original purpose of allowing citizen militias to 
overthrow a tyrannical government completely irrelevant.178  Nevertheless, 
he insisted that the Second Amendment remains necessary to protect the 
right of self-defense in the home.179  This conclusion perfectly reflects the 
transformation of the NRA’s arguments following the Oklahoma City ter-
rorist attack. 
In this respect, the result in Heller was not entirely surprising.  As in 
Brown v. Board of Education, the 1970s sex equality cases, and Lawrence 
v. Texas, the Supreme Court has kept its interpretation of the Constitution in 
line with changing public values.  Another name for this phenomenon is liv-
ing constitutionalism. 
There is no plausible account of living constitutionalism that does not 
involve the Court responding to popular culture, social movement mobiliza-
tion, and electoral politics.  Popular constitutionalism and partisan en-
trenchment drive doctrinal development.  Doctrinal development, in turn, 
shapes the direction of social movement and political activism.  It does this 
sometimes by changing facts on the ground, sometimes by shaping popular 
consciousness, sometimes by opening up new channels and opportunities 
for constitutional claims, and sometimes by spawning backlash and 
counter-mobilizations that attempt to discipline the courts and change their 
direction.  Constitutional politics influences constitutional courts; and in 
turn constitutional courts influence constitutional politics—both by what 
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Not all of the action occurs in the political arena.  Courts have plenty to 
do in shaping constitutional culture.  They have to hear cases and decide 
them, creating new doctrinal distinctions that become the basis for later liti-
gation and contestation.  Through their opinions, courts influence public 
opinion, but not always as they intend.  They may provoke reaction as much 
as they educate or enlighten.  By declaring what is legal and illegal, which 
claims are plausible and which are “off-the-wall,” court decisions reshape 
the terrain of politics and political meanings; they create new opportunities 
for political entrepreneurs, both those who support judicial decisions and 
those who oppose them. 
Above all, courts translate constitutional politics into constitutional 
law.  They really cannot help themselves, or more correctly, the work of a 
collection of Justices on a multimember court like the U.S. Supreme Court 
cannot help but produce this effect.  The Justices do this not because they 
are more intelligent, or more noble, or more farsighted, or more principled, 
or more sober than the rest of us.  Rather, they translate constitutional poli-
tics into constitutional law because of how they get their jobs and because 
they inhabit professional roles in which they must continually hear claims 
and articulate their answers in terms of the forms, practices and arguments 
of professional legal culture. 
B. Eliminate the Middleman? 
In living constitutionalism, popular mobilization, constitutional con-
structions by the political branches, and partisan entrenchment in the Judi-
ciary play a major role in shaping constitutional change.  The democratic 
legitimacy of this system of constitutional construction rests on the fact 
that, in the long run, it is democratically responsive.  In this way, the proc-
ess of constitutional construction, mediated through the three branches of 
the federal government, respects popular sovereignty.  However, this raises 
a second objection.  If constitutional change responds to political mobiliza-
tions, social movement activism, new forms of governance, presidential ap-
pointments strategies, and shifts in popular opinion, what is the purpose of 
having constitutional courts in the first place?  Why not just get courts out 
of the business of holding anything unconstitutional and exercise judicial 
restraint in almost every case?180  If the system of living constitutionalism 
gains its legitimacy from its democratic responsiveness, why not eliminate 
the middleman?  Why not leave all constitutional development to the ma-
joritarian political process? 
To answer this question, consider some key features of the system of 
living constitutionalism.  First, its effects tend to be conservative (in a po-
litical rather than ideological sense) because Justices reflect the views of 




180  For an argument along these lines, see Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—
Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31 (2005). 
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multimember court, that means that its members represent a variety of dif-
ferent positions, strewn across time.  Partisan entrenchment in the Judiciary 
tends to prevent quick and drastic changes in governance because it requires 
that political majorities win for sustained periods of time before they can 
change the legal culture and appoint new judges who will go along with 
their innovations. 
Second, these features add an additional supermajoritarian requirement 
to already supermajoritarian features of American democracy.  They create 
an additional veto point in the system: laws not only have to pass Congress 
and the President (or the state legislature and the Governor) but also the 
scrutiny of a court whose members were appointed by people at different 
times with very different political views.   
Due to these conserving and supermajoritarian features, living constitu-
tionalism creates a bias toward preserving the constitutional values of the 
political status quo.  If the vector sum of political forces changes swiftly on 
a constitutional issue, the courts will tend hold back and resist the views of 
the day until the change in constitutional culture proves lasting, in part be-
cause it will take time for new judges to replace older ones. 
These features of living constitutionalism share something in common.  
They are basic features of constitutionalism generally.  Constitutionalism 
channels and disciplines present-day majorities through supermajoritarian 
rules that they cannot easily change overnight (but can change eventually); 
this prevents drastic changes in governance and keeps temporary majorities 
from altering or subverting the constitutional values of more temporally ex-
tended supermajorities.  The system of living constitutionalism—like all 
constitutionalism—channels and disciplines ordinary politics by restraining 
simple majoritarianism.181 
Living constitutionalism sits squarely between two extremes: It incor-
porates significant aspects of democratic politics in producing constitutional 
constructions over time, yet it also maintains the benefits of supermajori-
tarian constitutionalism.  First, it requires fidelity to the hard-wired features 
of the Constitution absent an Article V amendment.  Second, it requires po-
litical victories sustained over a long period of time to change existing un-
derstandings of the Constitution’s text and structure that have been filled 
out through past constitutional construction. 
Living constitutionalism allows social and political mobilizations to 
shift the interpretation and application of abstract clauses and open-ended 




181  One additional feature concerns federalism.  Because the federal courts are appointed by the na-
tional political process, they will tend to keep regional majorities close to the views of the dominant na-
tional political coalition.  That is to say, the federal courts and the Supreme Court in particular are not so 
much countermajoritarian as they are nationalist.  See Balkin, supra note 36, at 1538–46.  However, the 
values of a national political coalition, as James Madison argued, may often be more moderate and bet-
ter protect the rights of minorities than those of a smaller, more homogenous political community.  THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
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has not altered the hard-wired features of the Constitutional text.  (To the 
extent the latter has happened, it is really quite exceptional, and, I think, 
quite wrong.)182  This approach is consistent with what I have called frame-
work originalism: It is faithful to the Constitution’s original meaning but 
not necessarily the original expected application of the text.  Long-term 
changes in constitutional culture can move us from Plessy v. Ferguson to 
Brown v. Board of Education, but they won’t allow a thirty-four-year-old 
President, or three Houses of Congress, or a simple majority of one House 
to overturn a presidential veto.  While Article V amendment is necessary 
for changing these hard-wired features of the Constitution, the interpreta-
tion, implementation, and application of vague and abstract terms like 
“equal protection” can and does change through sustained political mobili-
zation. 
Not surprisingly, fights between so-called originalist and living consti-
tutionalist approaches almost never concern the hard-wired features of the 
Constitution.  Instead, they almost always concern the Constitution’s ab-
stract guarantees and its silences.  Most living constitutionalists assume that 
the hard-wired features of the Constitution are binding today even though 
they were created a long time ago.  They do not object to the dead hand of 
the past with respect to those features; their concern is primarily the con-
struction and interpretation of those clauses and features that use the lan-
guage of general principles and standards.  Living constitutionalists argue 
that we are not bound by how the generation of 1791 or 1868 would have 
applied the text.  I agree.  It is our job to interpret the text in our own time. 
Under this model of living constitutionalism, successive generations 
may not reject the Constitution’s text and principles, but they may decide 
how best to honor, implement, and apply them through constitutional con-
structions and doctrinal implementations.  We can reject Plessy v. Fergu-
son, which is simply one generation’s attempt at implementing the 
Constitution, but not the words of the Equal Protection Clause. 
This model produces a system of judicial interpretation that is respon-




182  For example, the Supreme Court’s Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence beginning with Hans v. 
Louisiana, 134 US 1 (1890), seems to be inconsistent with the constitutional text: “The judicial power of 
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted 
against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign 
state.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XI.  See Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) 
(“[W]e have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the pre-
supposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms.”).  Current doctrine reads “citizens of an-
other State” to include citizens of the same state, Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 
(1996), and also allows suits in equity through the fiction of suits against the state’s attorney general, Ex 
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).  Perhaps the best defense of some kind of state immunity is a struc-
tural argument for protection of state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment, see Alden v. Maine, 527 
U.S. 706, 713–15 (1999), but it is not at all clear why structural considerations should produce the doc-
trine we currently have. 
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the short run.  It preserves constitutional law’s relative autonomy from eve-
ryday politics while making it responsive to constitutional politics. 
The system of living constitutionalism maintains the benefits of consti-
tutionalism while allowing adjustments in interpretation over time in the 
face of sustained democratic mobilization.  This makes it far superior to 
Justice Scalia’s version of originalism, which he must continually compro-
mise with exceptions for all those “mistakes.”  It also makes it superior to a 
system of pure majoritarianism, which lacks constitutional guarantees of 
basic rights and limits on government. 
Finally, this model of living constitutionalism features a system of ju-
dicial review but not a system of judicial supremacy.  This distinction is 
crucial: Courts act as a stabilizing force, and hold officials—and especially 
executive officials—accountable to law, but they never have the last word.  
The purpose of judicial review in this model is to represent and protect in as 
legally principled a way as possible the constitutional values of temporally 
extended majorities, and to prevent drastic changes in those constitutional 
values unless there has been extended and sustained support for change that 
is reflected in long-term changes in constitutional culture. 
Judges do not have to do anything special or out of the ordinary to par-
ticipate in the process of living constitutionalism.  They do not have to be 
politicians or moral theorists or divinities like Ronald Dworkin’s Hercu-
les.183  They do not have to be Platonic guardians184 or philosopher kings.  
They don’t have to be smarter, wiser, more moral, or more farsighted than 
anyone else.  All they have to do, once they get appointed, is to try to de-
cide the cases according to law, in the best way they can.185  If they just go 
about doing their jobs, they will, in spite of themselves, participate in the 
gradual translation of constitutional politics into constitutional law.  Mean-
while the job of members of the political community is to criticize how 
judges interpret the law and to try to persuade judges and other citizens that 
their interpretations of the Constitution are the best ones. 
IV. LIVING CONSTITUTIONALISM AS A PROCESS 
A third objection to my account of living constitutionalism is that it 
does not advocate any particular substantive changes in the Constitution but 
merely describes the process through which constitutional development oc-
curs.  Defenders and critics of the living constitution have generally as-
sumed that it is a philosophy of judging that purports to explain and justify 




183  See DWORKIN, supra note 97, at 239–40 (1986); RONALD M. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY 105–30 (1977). 
184  LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958) (“For myself it would be most irksome to be 
ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not.”). 
185  See FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 38; Barry Friedman, The Importance of 
Being Positive: The Nature and Function of Judicial Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1290 (2004). 
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sized the work of the political branches in living constitutionalism.  I have 
also noted that the processes of living constitutionalism can produce 
changes in diverse directions and I have even pointed to District of Colum-
bia v. Heller and Lawrence v. Texas as examples of living constitutionalism 
in action.  How can this be an adequate account of living constitutionalism 
if it does not tell judges how to decide cases, or direct the proper path of 
constitutional construction? 
People have often spoken of living constitutionalism as if it were an in-
terpretive approach or method that judges could and should consciously fol-
low, so that if judges employ it, they will arguably produce better or more 
just decisions.186  Critics have argued, to the contrary, that living constitu-
tionalism gives judges discretion to impose their personal preferences.187  
But my account does not offer particularized advice to judges, or give them 
suggestions that would better constrain them.  It is an account, to borrow a 
phrase, of the processes of constitutional decisionmaking,188 and their basis 
in democracy and in the ideals of popular sovereignty. 
Even so, my account of living constitutionalism is neither merely de-
scriptive nor purely external.  To the contrary, it is normative and takes an 




186  See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism and Its Discontents (Plus a Thought or Two About 
Abortion), 24 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 391–95, 400–04 (2007) (discussing the method of living constitu-
tionalism and its superiority to originalism and the method of text and principle); William J. Brennan, 
Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 438 
(1986) (arguing that courts must look to what the Constitution’s words mean today); Barry Friedman & 
Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1998) (“‘Living constitutional-
ism,’ . . . is the practice of interpreting the Constitution, usually in a nonhistorical way, to meet the needs 
of the present.”); Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Possibilities, 83 IND. L.J. 307, 315 (2008) (“In the 
choice between originalism and living constitutionalism as general methods of interpretation, it’s the 
method or practice (ranging across an action type) and not the individual decision (or action token) that 
counts.”); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 879 
(1996) (arguing that common law methods both constrain judges and permit evolution); see also Charles 
A. Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV. L. REV. 673, 735–36 (1963) (arguing 
that judges must adapt constitutional provisions as society changes or the provisions will atrophy); cf. 
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442–44 (1934) (Hughes, C.J.) (arguing that “the 
great clauses of the Constitution must [not]be confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the 
conditions and outlook of their time, would have placed upon them,” and calling for interpretation of the 
Constitution in light of changing times, and “a growing recognition of public needs”). 
187  See BORK, supra note 83, at 251–53 (explaining that nonoriginalist theories require judges to 
impose their moral views on democratic majorities in the absence of moral consensus and without any 
satisfactory theory of why judges have authority to do so); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living 
Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 693, 695 (1976) (versions of living constitutionalism which see 
judges as “the voice and conscience of contemporary society” allow judges to impose their personal and 
subjective moral views on the public); Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, supra note 
24, at 38–39 (living constitutionalism empowers judges to engage in common law reasoning based on 
their views of desirable outcomes); Scalia, supra note 28, at 863 (nonoriginalism leads judges to mistake 
their preferences for fundamental rights and values). 
188  PAUL BREST, SANFORD LEVINSON, JACK M. BALKIN, AKHIL REED AMAR & REVA B. SIEGEL, 
PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (5th ed. 2006). 
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gally binding.  It focuses on the entire system of constitutional develop-
ment, of which courts are only one part and considers that system’s role in 
promoting democratic legitimacy. 
A. Individuals and Systems 
In evaluating a constitutional and political system, we can focus our 
normative judgments on what individuals in a system should do within the 
system or how the system operates as a whole.  Sometimes we should focus 
on improving individual behavior, but sometimes the system is the proper 
focus.  Suppose, for example, that we want to solve a problem of social co-
ordination by designing an efficient market.  We ask how its design and in-
centives produce certain types of results, and if it does not, we redesign the 
market and shape the incentives.  We do not spend very much time giving 
advice to people in the market about how to behave so as to produce effi-
ciency; rather, we assume that efficiency arises from the sum of their inter-
actions and not from each of them following our advice about how to 
behave.  In fact, it may be a mistake to focus primarily on advising individ-
ual people about how to behave in the market, although educating people 
about costs and benefits might be a good idea; so too might be educational 
campaigns to shape people’s values and preferences. 
Another example of a focus on systems is our Constitution’s separation 
of powers.  The Constitution tries to preserve republican government by 
balancing contrasting interests, under the assumption, as Madison put it, 
that enlightened statesmen (i.e., the sort who would respond to good advice) 
will not always be at the helm.189  My account is of the same sort: it asks 
whether and how the structural features of the system of constitutional 
change—many of which developed over time—promote or detract from 
democratic legitimacy and popular sovereignty.  It asks whether the system 
works regardless of whether judges, lawyers or political actors are wise or 
foolish, noble or base. 
B. Advice to Judges or Theory of Legitimacy? 
To be sure, most people have assumed that a theory of living constitu-
tionalism must be a theory that tells judges, “Here’s how to decide cases 
that come before you.  Do this and don’t do that.”  Why do people think 
this?  Possibly it is because they think that originalism is just such a theory, 
and so they assume that living constitutionalism must be of the same kind, 
its mirror image.  They are wrong about living constitutionalism.  They are 
also wrong about originalism. 
Originalism offers directives to judges about how to decide cases be-
cause it is a theory of what makes the constitutional system—and the insti-




189  THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
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Constitution is necessary for democratic legitimacy.  There are several dif-
ferent theories for why that is so, but perhaps the most familiar version is 
that the Constitution was created through an act of popular sovereignty and 
therefore we must preserve the meaning of the Constitution over time in or-
der to respect the rule of law and preserve the democratic legitimacy of the 
initial act of lawmaking.  If judges must adhere to original meaning, they 
will do their part to maintain the system’s legitimacy.190 
Skycraper originalism closely connects what makes the constitutional 
system legitimate with instructions to individual judges about how to decide 
particular cases.  But living constitutionalism may not work in the same 
way.  Indeed, precisely because it is compatible with (and supplements) 
framework originalism, living constitutionalism may not offer much addi-
tional advice to the Judiciary beyond what framework originalism requires.  
It certainly does not offer contradictory advice: judges in a system of 
living constitutionalism should, at a minimum, respect the original meaning 
of the Constitution and try to apply its underlying principles to present day 
conditions.  Nevertheless the focus of living constitutionalism lies else-
where.  It concerns how the system as a whole works over long periods of 
time—why the cumulative processes that produce changing interpretations 
of the Constitution promote democratic legitimacy. 
Why do I emphasize how the constitutional system actually changes?  
Ought implies can.  Legitimacy depends on possibility.  We cannot expect 
actors to do what is not possible for them to do.  A causal and structural ac-
count of the constitutional system is a necessary precursor to any normative 
account of constitutional legitimacy.191  Sadly, much normative constitu-
tional theory seems to ignore this crucial question.  It assumes that if we 
just give judges the correct advice, and they follow this advice, the system 
as a whole will produce legitimate results.  Conversely, any problems of le-
gitimacy come from judges not following the theorists’ advice.  This ap-
proach does not always stop to ask whether individual judges on a 
multimember court could or would actually take the advice being offered, 
or, if they took it, whether the constitutional system as a whole would re-
spond in the right way. 
The work of a multimember court will not correspond to any coherent 
theory of advice directed at one individual.  The cases will go all over the 
place: they will not correspond to any consistent methodology.  To be sure, 
they may be consistent with the relatively modest requirements of frame-




190  See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 29, at 111 (arguing 
from popular sovereignty and noting that “[t]raditional defenses of originalism often employ some ver-
sion of a popular sovereignty argument”).  
191  For arguments emphasizing the importance of positive constitutional theory to understanding the 
legitimacy of judicial review, see Balkin, supra note 36, at 1537, 1574–77; Friedman, supra note 185, at 
1257–58, 1270–83, 1290; Mark A. Graber, Constitutional Politics and Constitutional Theory: A Misun-
derstood and Neglected Relationship, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 309, 312, 317–29 (2002).  
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nalism does not dictate the results of constitutional construction, and for a 
very large number of disputed cases, construction is the name of the game. 
This does not mean that normative criticisms of judges and their deci-
sions are useless or irrelevant to constitutional legitimacy.  Quite the con-
trary: criticizing courts and pushing for different constitutional 
constructions is crucial to the legitimacy of the system.  My point, rather, is 
that normative arguments about good judging and correct constitutional 
construction are not external to the system of constitutional change.  They 
are part of the process through which change occurs and they help secure its 
democratic responsiveness.  In a constitutional democracy like our own, 
citizens, judges, lawyers, and government officials continually make consti-
tutional claims and continually argue for their preferred vision.  The clash 
of opposed views about what the Constitution means and the clash of op-
posed positions about the authority of different actors in the system drives 
the system forward.  Dispute is the engine of living constitutionalism. 
When people argue with each other and try to persuade each other, 
they are helping to shape the constitutional culture in which citizens live 
and in which judges hear and decide cases.  When people make arguments 
about judges’ authority to interpret the Constitution, they are trying to in-
fluence their fellow citizens as well as judges.  They are shaping the 
boundaries of the reasonable, the notion of what sorts of claims are “off-
the-wall” and “on-the-wall” in the constitutional culture in which they live.  
Similarly, when political officials make legal arguments in public life, or 
when lawyers argue before courts, they are trying to persuade judges to rule 
their way, thus reshaping professional judgments and the constitutional cul-
ture of legal professionals.  Indeed, we can define a constitutional culture to 
a significant extent by what claims both ordinary citizens and professionals 
regard as reasonable and unreasonable, “off-the-wall” and “on-the-wall.”  
Citizens and professionals may differ in these judgments from time to time, 
but this is also an important aspect of constitutional culture, because it 
means that popular opinion and popular mobilizations may, over time, alter 
professional judgments. 
Thus, in my account of living constitutionalism, normative argument 
about the Constitution is hardly futile.  It is a central element of what makes 
a living Constitution live.  Arguments about what the Constitution means 
and who has the authority to say what it means are important because they 
can persuade the actors in the system to think differently.  They influence 
public opinion, the work of litigators and social movements, and the posi-
tions of politicians and political parties.  These forms of influence—
together with regular elections—produce new judicial appointments and can 
shape the views of judges who are already on the bench.  Normative argu-
ments about what the Constitution means occur in mobilization, political 
disputes, electoral politics, debates about judicial selection, and litigation 
campaigns.  They are the stuff of constitutional culture and the drivers of 
constitutional change. 
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C. Keeping up with the Times? 
Understood as an account of the processes of constitutional decision-
making, living constitutionalism makes a great deal of sense.  It also has the 
advantage of describing the actual history of our nation.  Understood as a 
doctrine for correct judging, however, “living constitutionalism” is an un-
der-theorized concept.  One popular formula of living constitutionalism is 
that judges should adapt to changing conditions, reflect changing values, 
and generally keep up with the times.  But such advice, directed at individ-
ual judges, is substantively empty.  When judges leave issues up to the po-
litical process, they can view themselves as allowing that process to 
respond to changing values and times.  (Think of the New Deal.)  When 
judges discipline the political process through judicial review they can view 
themselves as maintaining constitutional commitments in order to respond 
to changing values and times.  (Think of the civil rights revolution.) 
It is by no means clear why individual judges have any such obligation 
or responsibility to “keep up with changing times” or “reflect changing val-
ues” instead of doing what they are supposed to do, which is interpreting 
and applying the law as best they see it.  But even if judges had such a re-
sponsibility, there are many possible ways that one can  “adapt to changing 
conditions,” “reflect changing values,” and “keep up with the times.”  One 
can “keep up with the times” as a liberal or as a conservative, as a secular 
person or as a religious person, as a technophile or as a technophobe.  One 
simply does so in different ways.  One can respond to changing times by 
changing one’s values in the face of recalcitrant events, or by maintaining 
one’s values in the face of trials and temptations.  Civil libertarians argue 
for the latter position all the time, and there are many living constitutional-
ists among their number. 
Moreover, whose account of “changing conditions,” whose interpreta-
tion of “changing times,” and whose version of “changing values” should 
judges look to?  To my interpretation or to yours?  Should they look to the 
values of contemporary liberals or contemporary conservatives?  Both sets 
of values are constantly changing, and both of them are doing their very 
best to respond to changing times and circumstances. 
These questions have no useful answers.  Instead, a theory of living 
constitutionalism has a different project.  It seeks to explain why certain 
features of the constitutional system may change while others remain the 
same, and why those features that change do so in a way that preserves the 
values of constitutionalism, the rule of law, and democratic authority.  To 
offer a theory of living constitutionalism, one must understand how and 
why the Constitution lives, not simply advise it to shape up and live right. 
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D. The Translation of Constitutional Politics into Constitutional Law: 
On Horizontal and Vertical Translation 
In a system of living constitutionalism, lawyers and judges translate 
constitutional politics into constitutional law through their everyday profes-
sional tasks of litigating and deciding cases.  This concept of translation is 
somewhat different from Lawrence Lessig’s famous comparison between 
originalist judging and translating.192  Lessig argued that the right way for 
judges to be originalists was to analogize interpretation to the translation of 
an ancient text in a foreign language.  Given changed circumstances, we 
should try to enter into the world of the past and translate the expectations 
of the Framers into our present day concerns.193  Because I don’t think we 
are bound by original expected applications, I don’t accept Lessig’s thesis 
on precisely the terms he offered it.  Nevertheless, I think the metaphor of 
translation is powerful and evocative. 
Lessig’s model of translation was vertical, moving from past to pre-
sent: we translate the thick set of beliefs and expectations surrounding an 
ancient text into today’s meanings and applications.  My account of transla-
tion is horizontal: judges respond to the political and constitutional culture 
of their day and recognize it in their work, whether consciously or uncon-
sciously.  In Lessig’s model, translation was something that judges should 
do; in my model, it is something that judges actually do, whether they in-
tend to or not.  Judges engage in horizontal translation because of the way 
they are selected and the way that democratic politics shapes professional 
legal culture, legal argument, and legal decisionmaking.  An originalist like 
Justice Scalia may insist that he is only following the commands of long 
dead Framers, but, willy nilly, he is channeling the values of the contempo-
rary conservative movement.  He has done so overtly in his many dissents, 
making direct appeals to the public and decrying the values of liberal elites, 





192  Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1996). 
193  Id. at 1184–85; see also Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation: Fidelity and Constraint, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1376 (1997) (“Our aim has, for the most part, been to extract normative sig-
nificance from an ancient constitutional text and preserve that significance as much as possible.”). 
194  See, e.g, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602, 604–05 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the Court, dominated by elite culture, “has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda” 
and “that the Court has taken sides in the culture war”); see also Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, 
Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 566–68 
(2006) (noting that Scalia in particular has “mobilized conservative constituencies to bring political 
pressure to bear on the development of constitutional law”).  Scalia’s constitutional theory holds that 
judges should not decide constitutional questions based on contemporary social values.  See Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 1000 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“How up-
setting it is, that so many of our citizens . . . think that we Justices should properly take into account 
their views, as though we were engaged not in ascertaining an objective law but in determining some 
kind of social consensus.”).  Nevertheless, his arguments often mesh with the values of conservative el-
ites; indeed, he owes his Supreme Court appointment to the success of movement conservatism. 
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The word “translate” means to carry across, and lawyers’ arguments 
and judge’s decisions carry ideas, values, and commitments from the realm 
of politics to the realm of law.  The work of judges and lawyers perpetually 
traverse the membrane that separates law from politics while simultane-
ously preserving that boundary by operating through professional rhetoric 
and norms.  Judges and lawyers re-conceptualize the claims of constitu-
tional politics in the materials of the law, transforming, professionalizing, 
and rationalizing them in the process.  This process is horizontal translation, 
the translation of constitutional politics into constitutional law. 
I emphasize the contributions of lawyers as well as judges because 
lawyers shape the claims of litigants and members of social movements and 
present them before the Judiciary.  Litigation—and the resources devoted to 
litigation—shape the direction of constitutional construction, for judges 
cannot hear cases that are not brought to them.195  Lawyers are the great 
translators of our political life, collecting the stories, claims and grievances 
of Americans and spinning them into the discourse of power that we call le-
gal reason. 
The past—and the meaning of the past—matter greatly in horizontal 
translation.  Judges, lawyers, and their fellow citizens often reason with 
each other by invoking the past—not only the values, concerns, and hopes 
of the Framers, but also those of those of succeeding generations, like the 
generations of the New Deal, World War II, or the civil rights revolution.  
In fact, it often seems that between precedent and history, constitutional ar-
gument appears to be about nothing other than the past, albeit the nation’s 
entire past, not just the moment of the Founding.  But people invoke the 
memory of the past in order to face each other in the present, and to reason 
about how to apply the Constitution in their own time.  In a democracy like 
ours, moral and political disagreement is a fact of life.  The past serves a 
crucial function: it provides a common stock of intellectual resources, val-
ues, and commitments that people with very different views can draw upon 
to reason with each other in a political community so that they can decide 
what to do and how to go forward.196  People preserve democratic commu-
nity and democratic legitimacy by using the past to decide what to do in the 
present.  Constitutional doctrine translates these arguments and counter-
arguments into constitutional law. 
Courts must think and act and in terms of legal forms and practices; 
they must make legal arguments and write legal opinions.  Their job is not 
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judges should do anything but interpret and construct law.  They should be 
faithful to text and principle and use the various modalities of argument—
text, structure, history, precedent, prudence, and national ethos—to decide 
the cases before them.  The work of translation and change will take care of 
itself without much effort on their part.  They will disagree among them-
selves, often heatedly, about the direction in which doctrine should travel, 
but that by itself does not make the process of change illegitimate.  Rather, 
this process of disagreement about the law over time—and the mutual rec-
ognition of opposing positions—is itself part of the process of horizontal 
translation that helps secure the democratic legitimacy of constitutional 
change through constitutional construction. 
Through doing law (not politics) and working in tandem and in opposi-
tion with each other, successive generations of lawyers and judges inevita-
bly translate changes in constitutional politics into constitutional law.  They 
do so because new judges replace older ones, and because the judges who 
hear cases and decide them are influenced and shaped by the constitutional 
culture that they live in.  This culture includes not only professional norms 
of what is “off-the-wall” and “on-the-wall” legally, but also popular notions 
of constitutional values that influence professional judgments.  In this way 
living constitutionalism produces change that preserves legitimacy in a de-
mocratic society while allowing judges to continue being judges. 
E. The Role of Dissent in a System of 
Living Constitutionalism 
 Individuals within the constitutional system will not always like how 
judges or the political branches engage in constitutional construction be-
cause the system will often produce constitutional changes that they do not 
agree with.  Many people, perhaps most, instinctively associate “living con-
stitutionalism” with whatever is liberal or progressive and therefore support 
or oppose it.  But this characterization is incorrect.  As noted previously, a 
Constitution that grows and changes in response to social and political mo-
bilizations is as likely to move to the right as to the left.  Indeed, it has 
moved in many different directions over the course of our nation’s history.  
Moreover, what we call “left” and “right” today are the products of coali-
tion building—a configuration of contingent forces and events.  The content 
of these ideas has been different and will be different again.  Someday they 
may be replaced by other ideas and labels that will better describe the po-
litical disputes of the future. 
The conservative dominance of the last forty years is an important ex-
ample of the process of living constitutionalism at work, even though many 
of its proponents have fought under the banner of originalism.  There is no 
contradiction here.  Appeals to the values of the Framers or Founders are a 
pretty standard way that people call for restoration or redemption.  Appeals 
to origins are a familiar way that people justify constitutional change out-
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side of Article V (and change within it too).  Like many revolutionary 
movements before it, the conservative movement of the late twentieth cen-
tury has been predicated on a return to an imagined origin, a restoration of 
proper principles it claims that later generations have abandoned.  There is 
nothing unusual about this: revolutions often use the tropes of return and 
restoration to promote what is actually change.  The conservative original-
ism of the past several decades has been an attempt to replace a more liberal 
constitutionalism with a more conservative one.  In many ways, it has suc-
ceeded.  Whether liberal critics like it or not, this change is also an example 
of the living Constitution.  In a conservative era, the positive constitutional 
law of a living constitution will become more conservative in many re-
spects.  That is how the Constitution “keeps up with the times” and “reflects 
changing values.” 
Why should citizens recognize the legitimacy of this process if it gen-
erates constitutional constructions that citizens disagree with?  They should 
recognize and respect it because it is the same process that produced consti-
tutional constructions they also respect and admire.  Each of us will find 
some decisions of the courts to disagree with, and others that we truly de-
spise.  But we must accept these decisions as law while working to change 
them over time through the processes of legal persuasion in the courts and 
political mobilization outside the courts.  I can argue that these decisions 
are bad interpretations of the law and work to distinguish or overrule them, 
just as people who disagree with me can work to limit or overturn decisions 
that they do not like.  The ability of citizens to talk back to courts—their 
ability to redraw the boundaries of what is reasonable and unreasonable 
through persuasion, protest, political action, and other forms of shaping 
popular opinion—is crucial to democratic legitimacy.  Faced with a deeply 
unjust decision, Dred Scott v. Sandford, Abraham Lincoln once said that 
Dred Scott was law and should be respected until it was altered or over-
turned, but “we mean to do what we can to have the Court decide the other 
way.”197  Here Lincoln articulated the basic premise of a living Constitution 
as a process: the Supreme Court’s decisions deserve respect as positive law, 
but not respect as proper interpretations of the Constitution, unless, in fact, 
they are the right interpretations.  People can and should work to overturn 
decisions that, in their opinion, are contrary to the Constitution’s spirit, and 
to its text and its principles, through political mobilizations, through the ap-
pointments process and through legal arguments directed at judges and le-
gal officials. 
People who disagree with particular decisions must accept them as 
positive law, but need not accept them as correct.  A system of living con-
stitutionalism means that I can always dissent during “dark times” when my 
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are correct and work for the restoration or the redemption of important con-
stitutional values.  Through this agonistic process of mobilizations and 
counter-mobilizations of groups who seek the restoration and redemption of 
Constitutional values, the Constitution maintains its public acceptability.   
Moreover, this process provides its own constraints on runaway con-
struction by the courts and the political branches.  As Reva Siegel has 
pointed out, both sides of a constitutional controversy must appeal to com-
mon values and common political goods in order to persuade the public that 
their views are correct.  They must modify their positions to appeal to the 
values of the (imagined) center and, in the process, they often acknowledge 
and incorporate aspects of each others’ views.198  The clash of mobilization 
and counter-mobilization, the necessities of everyday politics, and the need 
to compromise and make positions palatable provide yet another checking 
function in our constitutional system, like the separation of powers itself.  
This does not make constitutional politics either principled or unprincipled; 
the point, rather, is that the content, scope, and effect of the constitutional 
principles that the political process produces are continually being recon-
ceptualized and reconfigured in the crucible of democratic politics.  We can 
see the reshaping of constitutional claims in the context of debates over ra-
cial equality, sex equality, free speech, and even the right to bear arms.199  
Contemporary liberal claims about the Constitution have been shaped by 
the conservative constitutional culture of our era, just as today’s conserva-
tive constitutionalism reacted to and absorbed important features of the 
more liberal constitutional culture that preceded it. 
F. Living Constitutionalism and the Problem of 
Constitutional Evil200 
A final objection to my account of living constitutionalism is that the 
process I describe might lead to very bad and unjust results.  My account of 
living constitutionalism may possess sociological legitimacy because con-
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legitimacy because constitutional construction employs standard forms of 
legal argument and because it is democratically responsive in the long run.  
Yet it may lack moral legitimacy because constitutional constructions can 
be very unjust; they can oppress minority groups and individual citizens, 
and undermine or even destroy democratic values. 
A system of framework originalism and living constitutionalism may 
be democratically legitimate and still produce or countenance very unjust 
results that well-trained lawyers can defend using plausible legal argu-
ments.  This well describes most of American constitutional history.  
Throughout our history minorities have been badly treated and rights denied 
in ways that we would find completely unacceptable in a constitutional de-
mocracy today.  This is not to assume that we inhabit a privileged position: 
no doubt future generations may think the same of some practices in our 
current political order. 
As an example of what the processes of constitutional change de-
scribed in this Article might lead to, consider the Bush Administration’s 
claim—most often associated with Dick Cheney, David Addington, and 
John Yoo, that when the President acts in his capacity as Commander-in-
Chief, he cannot be bound by Congressional enactments that seek to limit 
his powers.  This includes, among other things, laws against domestic sur-
veillance and even laws against torture and cruel and inhumane treatment.201 
The famous “torture memos” produced by the Office of Legal Counsel 
articulate this theory; they sound quite lawyerly, and they make coherent 
legal arguments, even if they are not very good arguments.  They exemplify 
an important fact about legal discourse—that well-trained lawyers can make 
truly bad legal arguments that argue for very unjust things in perfectly le-
gal-sounding language.  No one should be surprised by this fact.  Today 
lawyers make arguments defending the legality of torture and, indeed, 
claiming that laws that would prevent the President from torturing people 
are unconstitutional.202  In the past lawyers have used legal-sounding argu-
ments to defend the legality of slavery,203 Jim Crow,204 and compulsory ster-
ilization.205 
Elsewhere I have asserted that the Cheney/Addington/Yoo theory of 
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rule by decree (or indeed without decree) and is in this sense tantamount to 
presidential dictatorship.206  Such a theory has little basis in the original un-
derstanding of the Founding period, which feared the rise of a new Caesar 
or Cromwell; it is a product of the modern era.207  But even if we stipulate 
that it is a bad interpretation of the Constitution, could the courts adopt such 
a theory through the processes of living constitutionalism described in this 
Article?  It is certainly possible that they could, for the President and his 
lawyers pushed it vigorously on many occasions.  A few more Supreme 
Court appointments who saw things the President’s way, and we might be 
well on our way to a conception of presidential power that would have been 
unimaginable only ten years before.  As noted above, courts have made 
many bad and unwise decisions in our nation’s history.  Nobody should un-
derestimate what lawyers in high places can do armed with legal language.  
But the more important question is whether the constitutional system as a 
whole can correct the excesses of such lawyers. 
Ultimately, it is a question of design and faith in that design: whether a 
system of living constitutionalism such as we have can set ambition against 
ambition, mobilization against counter-mobilization, and judicial conserva-
tion against political zeal in a way that preserves a decent society or at least 
helps us move haltingly toward a more decent one.  The question is whether 
the system of living constitutionalism we have generated through years of 
construction is a worthy successor to the Framers’ idea of separation of 
powers and checks and balances—a system that moderates, tests, and 
checks; and one that makes politics both possible and accountable to pru-
dence and reason.  This is a question of both reason and faith; of both prac-
tical knowledge and of moral commitment to preserving just institutions 
and working for better ones.208 
It is possible, but very unlikely, that five Justices of the Supreme Court 
would adopt reasoning like that of the Torture Memos.  Unlikely, because it 
would require the Justices to overturn a lot of precedent and disregard basic 
principles of the constitutional system.  Possible, because the history of our 
country shows that constitutional culture can change greatly, given enough 
time.  But the fact that courts make bad decisions, and even evil decisions, 
does not mean that the constitutional system as a whole becomes illegiti-




206  See Jack M. Balkin, Reductio Ad Dictatorem, Balkinization, Apr. 7, 2006, http://balkin.blogspot.
com/2006/04/reductio-ad-dictatorem.html. 
207  See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—
Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 695–97, 800–04 
(2008); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at The Lowest Ebb—A Consti-
tutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 947–51, 1057–59, 1100 (2008); David Luban, On the Com-
mander in Chief Power, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 477 (2008). 
208  See Balkin, Constitutional Redemption, supra note 3, at 427–28, 436–42; Balkin, Respect-
Worthy, supra note 119, at 493–97; Jack M. Balkin, The Declaration and the Promise of a Democratic 
Culture, 4 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 167, 175–80 (1999). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 614 
portant question is whether our constitutional system offers opportunities to 
correct bad judicial decisionmaking—through sustained criticism and pro-
test, through changing people’s minds about what our Constitution requires, 
through political responses and political workarounds, and through the judi-
cial appointments process.  These features of political practice are part of 
the checks and balances of our constitutional system.  We recognize them 
easily when the President and Congress are in conflict, but perhaps less eas-
ily when the courts are involved—perhaps because we think incorrectly that 
they have the last word on the meaning of the Constitution.  
CONCLUSION 
The system of living constitutionalism we have created has produced 
new checks and balances to buttress the ones provided in our original Con-
stitution.  It is a good thing, too.  National power has increased, and with 
the blessing and support of the political branches the courts have become 
more important and more powerful.  Institutions have grown up, politics has 
become more complex, and power can be asserted through ever new means.  
We are always in need of new ways for power to check power, and hold off 
the destruction of free government. 
These same features of our political system offer us the means to pre-
vent such bad decisions from occurring in the first place.  Today nobody 
can be appointed to the Supreme Court who thinks that Jim Crow policies 
are constitutional.  But that was not true through most of our country’s his-
tory.  It only became true because of years of political and legal struggle. 
If the Supreme Court adopted a theory of presidential dictatorship, it 
might send us spiraling down toward the end of our two-centuries-old con-
stitutional experiment with democracy—a possibility that the Framers 
imagined but tried to forestall.  Or it might not.  The next administration 
might come along, take very different positions, and appoint new Justices 
who would distinguish the bad decision, or even overrule it.  But in any 
case, it would not simply be a question of us waiting passively for the Court 
to decide our fates.  There are things we might and should do to promote 
the restoration of proper constitutional government.  The fact that the Con-
stitution is in all of our hands, and not simply the hands of the Justices, is 
the reason why we have a living Constitution.  
 
 
